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INTRODUCTION
This sub-thesis studies Soviet policy towards 
the Ba'thist Iraq. Basically, it is a recapitulation of the 
Iraqi scene which offered, or denied, opportunities to the 
USSR during the period 1968-75. It sets out the context, 
as projected by Soviet media, within which the Soviet policy 
operated. Without undertaking an exhaustive treatment of the 
nature, or evolution of, Soviet relations with Iraq, this sub­
thesis attempts to outline the Soviet perception of the 
following three inter-related problems of the area directly 
involving Iraq and, subsequently, affecting development of 
the Soviet policy:
a. formation of a ‘united front' of all 
'progressive' forces of the Ba'thist Iraq.
b. resolution of the 'nationalities question' 
of autonomy/separation seeking Kurds.
c. promotion of friendlier relations of Iraq 
with the neighbouring Iran.
In other words, this sub-thesis will project and explain the 
nature of Moscow's pattern of interaction with Iraq and its 
governing logic in the regional context.
1
Instead of undertaking a country to country 
approach, Iraq was selected, arbitrarily, for the purpose 
of this research. It was done, because Iraq was, Kremlin 
believed, the only country of the area which "on the whole” 
was striving for socialist construction and following the 
non-capitalist path of development and had all the afore­
said problems on its agenda. Thus, the study of the Ba'thist 
Iraq provided us with a unique example where the Soviet 
response towards these three dimensions of political 
process could be seen progressing simultaneously. Hence, 
it was held imperative to delimit ourselves to the post-68 
Ba'thist Iraq.
Soviet policy towards Persian Gulf has long intri­
gued policy-makers and scholars alike. Scholarly literature 
on the Soviet policy in the region, highlighting geopolitics 
and the legacy of Tsarist expansion into Central Asia, stresses 
that Moscow's interaction is marked by historical continuity 
with Tsarist Russia. The present leaders in Moscow are seen 
to nurse the same ambitions as their predecessors in the 
ninets><?:hth century when in the 'Great Game' the two advancing 
empires, Tsarist Russia and British India, met each other in 
Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey.
Such geopolitical and historical continuity explana­
tions of Soviet behaviour remain theoretically inadequate 
and historically inaccurate as they fail to explain variations 
in Soviet policies over time. Geography and history alone can
2
3not explain why Soviet policies towards its southern 
neighbours were qualitatively different from Tsarist poli­
cies under the two Bolshevik regimes of Lenin and Stalin.- 
Besides, the USSR is much less inhibited by constraints of 
geography and history than its predecessor, the Tsarist 
state. Insofar as geography and history are an integral 
part of the operational and psychological environment of 
any nation, they shape and condition its external orientation. 
This orientation, however, itself cannot be the expression 
of these forces as Barrington Moore pointed out: "the 
driving forces behind any contemporary expansionism must be 
found in a contemporary social situation. Historical and 
geographical factors may limit the expression of an expan­
sion drive. They cannot be expansionist forces in their own 
right11.'*’ Therefore, instead of basing our study on explanations 
which are heavily skewed in favour of geography and history 
as explanatory factors, we emphasize the importance of the 
Soviet ideology and therein professed role of the Soviet 
state in the world system as the motivating force behind 
Moscow's policies.
With this background in mind, Chapter-1 traces 
history of Russian policy towards the countries of the Gulf 
area from the early nineteenth century to the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917 on the one hand and from 1917 to 1953 on 
the other. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight theo­
retical inadequacy and historical inaccuracy of Western 
interpretations of Soviet motives in the Gulf area which
4have, by and large, relied upon a carry-over from a situa­
tion which no longer exists. This chapter further argues 
that except for Iran, there has been little historical contact 
between Russia and the countries of the Gulf region. In 
historical terms, the Russian policy vis-a-vis Iraq can be 
best viewed as forming part of the 'Middle Eastern Question1 
which stretched from India, Afghanistan and Iran on the one 
hand to the Turkish Straits and Constantinople on the other. 
Iraq, lying in the midst of these two poles had very little 
importance of its own. Thus, throughout the 'Great G a m e 1 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centries, Iraq's 
importance for the Tsarist Russia remained that of peri­
pheral interest. Tsarist policy was to apply pressure in one 
areato gain concessions in another. The situation has totally 
changed as the Gulf is no longer a specifically British 
sphere of influence and the Indian sub-continent is no longer 
a British possession, while the main antagonist is no longer 
Britain but the United States which cannot be pressurised 
in one area for concessions in another in quite the same 
way as was the case in the Tsarist times.
The changed character of the Soviet state is stressed 
in Chapter-2 which outlines the ideological framework of the 
Soviet Third world policy, without necessarily implying that 
ideology is an independent variable shaping Moscow's decisions. 
The broader Soviet approach towards the Third World-of which 
Iraq was an integral part for the Soviets-is emphasised
5by discussing in this chapter the ideological tenets of 
the Soviet State ideology. This gives an appraisal of the 
doctrinal contours within which the Soviet leadership 
explained, if not operated, their policy. The ideological 
re-appraisals of the early 1960s and onwards, this chapter 
argues, projected the ideological flexibility and an evolving 
adaptibility which provided the Soviet decision-makers with 
a framework to approach the complex problems of Ba'thist 
Iraq. In context of the 'national liberation movements' of 
particular interest to us in this chapter were the problems 
of a 'national democratic state' and how it handles (or 
should handle) the issues like 'united front', 'non-capitalist 
path of development', and the 'nationalities question'. On 
the part of the Soviets, they, insofar as possible, this 
chapter concludes, wanted to develop relations with all 
kinds of states, be they progressive or not. It was essentially 
this doctrinal flexibility which enabled Moscow to try to 
court the Ba'thist regime of Iraq in the late 1960s and 
onwards.
As against these ideological tenets, chapters 3, 4 
and 5 aim at projecting how these ideological principles were 
translated into policy. Three specific questions are addressed 
in these chapters respectively. First, regarding the 
establishment of a United Front; second, regarding the 
Nationalities Question which concerned an autonomy/separation 
seeking minority; and third, the question of friendly coopératif
with a neighbourly, pro-western monarchical state i.e.
Iran with whom Iraq had shared the Kurdish minority and a 
disputed frontier. These chapters thus focus on the problems 
of Ba'thist Iraq affecting Soviet policy towards, and relations 
with the post-68 Ba'thist Iraq.
2
Officially founded in 1952, the Ba'th Party of 
Iraq was in direct competition with the Iraqi Communist Party. 
Bitter rivalry had dominated relations between the two parties 
since.General Abdul-Karim Kassem's advent to power in July 
1958. Their relations further deteriorated after the communist 
.role in the suppression of the Mosul revolt."5 Thus when the Ba'thists 
seized power in 1963, they were detemined to eliminate the Ccmmmists.
A statement by the Central Cannittee of the Ccmnunist Party charged that the 
Ba'thists have put to death more communists than those
4
executed by Nuri al-Said during a quarter of a century.
The persecution of communists continued, even though a new 
Ba'thist government, established in July 1968, began pursuing 
policies friendlier to the USSR. As Baghdad began to move 
closer to the USSR, relations between the Ba'thists and 
the communists improved somewhat. In April 1972, a treaty 
of friendship and cooperation was signed between the two 
countries. A cabinet reshuffle in May 1972 brought two - 
communists in^the government. Yet, both remained suspicious 
of each other's ideology as well as of policies.
In February 1968, Dimitry Volsky, a Soviet comment­
ator stated in the New Times that "the success of the liberation
7movement in the eastern part of the Arab world depends
5
very largely on how things go in Iraq". The Ba'th Party 
of post-1968 was described by Soviet analysts as having 
formulated a platform which was compatible with the interests 
of most Iraqis. One of the most pressing tasks confronting 
the Iraqi government was the creation of a 'national front' 
unifying Mall progressive, anti-imperialist organisations" 
including the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Iraqi Communist 
Party. Chapter 3 traces how the Soviets impressed Iraq to 
forge a united front and travel along the non-capitalist 
road of development, held so important for anti-imperialist 
struggle. As against these intricacies involved in forging 
a front of the above-said major actors, cheater 4 highlights 
the efforts pursued for resolution of the Kurdish Question.
It has recapitulated fluctuations in the Soviet political 
moves, in cultivating relations with the ruling Ba'ths, at 
times even at the cost of the Iraqi communists. It was not 
only the Kurdish problem which divided Iraq and Iran, Moscow 
held, but also the imperialist powers' "divide and rule" 
policy. Against such western "conspiracies", Soviet commenta­
tors on their part emphasised the need for peaceful and 
friendly relations between the tv/o countries. Chapter-5 
brings into perspective progressive Iraq's reactions with 
the 'reactionary' and 'pro-Western' monarchical Iran, and 
the Soviet Union's apparent neutrality. We find that despite 
sharp criticism of Iran's military role in the region, 
strong ties with the West and arms acquisitions, Soviet
8media did not take sides in Iraq-Iran relations but instead 
encouraged their friendlier relations— much to Iraq's 
discomfort.
The purpose of putting these three aspects together 
is to integrate the dimensions upon which hinges the Soviet 
policy towards a Third World Country. With this we have, it 
is hoped, brought into perspective the imperative need of 
understanding an over-all Soviet approach towards a national 
democratic regime where she, despite apparent strong influence, 
largely remains less competent to influence the local dynamics 
of politics. We find that the interacting local forces in 
Iraq's case had their own momentum which was largely beyond 
Moscow's control.
A word about the sources: A constant problem in any 
study of Soviet policy is the relative weight to be attached, 
in absence of any open public debate inside USSR, to declara­
tory policy, official statements and media broadcasts. No 
attempt is made to establish the relative weight of these 
sources. As opposed to Chapter 1 and 2 which rely on contemporary 
sources, both primary and secondary, chapter 3, 4 and 5 rely 
exclusively upon the radio broadcasts as monitored by Foreign 
Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS). This was done, 
partly to avoid excessive reliance on purely formal decla­
ratory policy and mainly to highlight the Soviet perception 
as projected through the media. By inferrence, it can
9perhaps also be argued that the state controlled Soviet 
media is :if airly accurate representative of Soviet policies 
and thus a close monitoring of it can provide with valuable 
insights into the evolving Soviet response to the unfolding 
regional crises. Occasionally, somewhat hasty and generali­
zed statements/commentries did surface during the period 
but these were probably targetted at generating optimism 
in its listners and hid-;ti Soviet difficulties.
CHAPTER-1
RUSSIAN AND SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE 
PERSIAN GULF REGION: 1800-1953
The Russian policy towards the Persian Gulf during 
1800-1917 was, by and large, a contest for political ascendancy 
with the British. There was a prolonged 'cold war' from the 
beginning of the eighteenth century between the two Empires 
over what is called 'the Central Asian Question'.^ Their 
rivalry in this area began with two developments of funda­
mental nature. Firstly, the emergence of Russia as a Great 
Power to play an important role in the European Concert and 
beyond, after Russia's contribution to the defeat of Napoleon. 
Secondly, the rise of the 'Forward School' in British India 
and London, which aspired to seeing British India's 'natural' 
frontiers running from the Indus to the Nile. Russian moves 
in the region under our study during the period were motivated 
by considerations of bringing pressure on the British in one 
area in order to acquire objectives in another.
The purpose of this chapter is argue that the Soviet 
concerns and motivations in the area are entirely different from 
those of the nineteenth century, and therefore, the situation 
has so totally changed as to render interpretations based 
on past history totally invalid. This chapter does not pretend 
to be a comprehensive study of Russian policy. An attempt is 
made to outline the context within which Russian policy
10
11
operated. Their interests and objectives are discussed in 
order to analyse Russian strategy and identify a pattern 
of continuity and change. In other words, it is a brief survey 
of recurrent Russian fears, motives and actions during the 
specified period. But first a framework through which the 
past can be viewed is in order.
I ;
The geographical position and the resultant historical 
experiences of a country largely determine its perceptions and 
foreign-military policies. The Russian Empire, spreading over 
two continents, has long been subject to the threats of invasion 
by advanced and dynamic European powers on the one hand, and 
border violations by marauding nomads on the other. With 
approximately fixed boundaries in Europe by the early nine­
teenth century, technologically backward and militarily weak 
states to the South and East offered opportunities for expansion. 
The experiences of the pas t , when between 1812 and 1941 it was
invaded thrice, twice threatening the Russian heartland, left
2
the Russians apprehensive concerning their .security. This 
resulted in overwhelmingly continental concerns, and in a 
deep desire to secure clear and geographically defensible 
frontiers in the South and East, if not in Europe where it was 
virtually impossible. The policies adopted appear to be 
obsessive in their concern to eliminate or reduce any threat­
ening military capability. This was achieved by pre-emptive 
strikes, by expanding political control, and by annexing 
the bordering 'barbaric' states and vast stretches of un-
12
inhabited lands. These areas, in time, would also serve 
as a buffer between the Russian heartland and potential 
enemies.
Access to commercial outlets was another considera­
tion dictated by geography. In the absence of any elaborate 
4
railway system, a substantial part of Russian trade was
5
carried along rivers. This led the Russian expansion to 
follow, more often than not (throughout the nineteenth
0
century), the course of the major rivers. The other Russian 
ports being seasonal and far away from major trading centres, 
Russian westward expansion, the control of the Turkish 
Straits and the Constantinople, ranked high in St. Petersburg's
7
strategic thinking. Economic well being, as well as security 
considerations, demanded that no hostile power should dominate 
these waterways. Russian interests and objectives in the area 
of our study, therefore, had to be defined within the frame­
work of the larger interests of the Empire. Different 
combinations of power relationships between the Russian,
British and Ottoman Empires with the French and later with 
the Germans and Japanese, were to influence the formulation 
and execution of Russian strategy. The British Government 
in India had a set of attitudes towards Russia which had 
been derived from the Russian role in European affairs.
When these perceptions were extended into India, Afghanistan 
and Central Asia, they were to determine the course of events 
of the 'Great Game*. This was a race to gain greater strategic
3
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advantages by occupying or controlling strategic positions.
The scheme on both sides was to press forward and forestall 
the adversary in the acquisition of political influence. Each, 
in pursuit of its imperial ambitions, considered the adversary 
to be the aggressor. "It is possible" wrote Lorimer in one 
Government of India's Gazeteer, "that neither Russian nor 
British politicians had at (that) time any adequate concep­
tion of the difficulties, physical or political, that the
g
players of the Great Game would face".
A recurring reference in discussions of Central Asian 
Question has often been the famous "will" of Peter the Great 
(1&82-1725). In this "will" Peter the Great is said to have 
advised his successors to obtain an outlet to the sea through
9
the Persian Gulf and advance "as far as India". The "will"
was clearly recognised as a fake, and nobody took it seriously
for many decades after its appearance in a book by a Frenchman
called Le Sur in 1 8 1 1 . ^  This fraudulent document, however,
was often used to justify the forward policies of British
I n dia.^  The validity and the binding force of this document
to his successors aside, the dawn of the nineteenth century
is marked with a joint Franco-Russian plan to "liberate"
India. After Napoleon's withdrawal from the agreement Tsar
Paul I (1796-1801), considered by his contemporaries to
be mad, undertook this venture alone and sent a small army
12towards India. After his assassination, Alexander I 
(1801-25), his successor, abandoned the plan. Napoleon, with
14
his dreams of Asiatic conquest , in 1807 again suggested a
joint Franco-Russian assault. This plan, which is properly
13
said to have "belonged to the world of fantasy", was 
abandoned, like the first, as Franco-Russian relations became 
increasingly strained.
Russian policy was aimed less at conquering India, 
and more at manipulating the Indian issue as a leverage for 
broader balance of power considerations. This was a theme 
which recurred periodically, and which was to create grounds 
for Britain's "forward policy" and at times what was called 
"masterly inactivity".
The upholders of the Forward School advocated
the extension of British rule to the south and east of the
River Sutlej. The annexation could lead, they claimed, to
more trade and profits; cheaper and more effective government;
the consolidation of British power, and the acquisition of
a power base to protect British defence capability against 
14invasions. Under the influence of this line of thinking, 
the British activities started focusing "well beyond the 
frontiers of I n d i d ^  into Persia, Central Asia and Afghanistan. 
British missions and spies in the guise of merchants and 
travellers were sent into the area to cause alarm in St. 
Petersburg. These agents were, as Michael Edwards has 
summarized, "theorists who carefully tailored such facts
10
as came their way to suit their theories". They rarely 
came across directly but invariably heard of the activities
15
agents and merchants would be followed by the Russian army.
The four rival information-gathering centres in India often
17
exaggerated the magnitude of these feelings. This culminated
in a frenzy of Russophobia: already the fashion among some
18
of the Conservatives and many traveller-scholars in London.
Russian active involvement in the area, however,
began with the wars against Persia, beginning in 1804. In
the last quarter of the seventeenth century Georgia declared
her independence from Persia and aligned herself with 
19Russia. Driven by territorial ambitions and instigated 
20
by Napoleon , Persia attacked Georgia aiming to re-occupy
it. Western Georgia was particularly significant to the
Russians, as from there, they could control the provinces
of Northern Persia and expert pressure on the Ottoman Empire.
21
The war ended in the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) whereby
Persia accepted Russian control from the north of the
Caucasus to the banks of the Araxes. In addition, Russia
got the exclusive right to sail ships of war in the Caspian
Sea. Disappointed by the British, Persia now sought French
help and signed the Treaty of Finkenstein in 1807, declaring
Russia to be the common enemy of both the Persian and French
22Empires.
The British activities in the area during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, on the other hand, were mainly of 
a political and commercial nature. But starting with Napoleonic
of Russian agents. Many in India believed that Russian
16
diplomatie activités in 1798, and the arrival of one of 
the pioneers of the Forward School, Richard Wellesley , as 
Governor-General in India, a new era of vigorous British 
involvement beyond Indian borders began. The frantic nature 
of the British reaction to French activities during this 
time captures the central theme of British policy for the 
rest of the century.
By 1808-9, the Forward Schools'views were shared
by many in London and India. Exploiting the weakness of
23Persia, the Persian Shah was persuaded by the British to
sign a commercial and political treaty in 1808. This was
followed by the 'Definitive Treaty' (1814) of mutual defence
against any European aggressor, and in the Persian Shah's
commitment to invade Afghanistan if the latter attacked
24
British possessions in India. This treaty was designed^
to 'frighten' the Afghans and the Russians, as the French
threat had diminished; and to stiffen the Shah's determina—
25tion to resist Russia. This treaty encouraged the Shah
2 6
to nourish illusions of British help so he declared another
war against Russia. This war, like the first, ended in another
27
humiliating treaty, the Treaty of Turkmanchai (1826). In 
order to compensate for some of his territorial losses, the 
Shah seized Herat. Britain, contrary to the treaty's pro­
visions, sided with Herat against Persia, and occupied the
2 8
Persian island of Kharj in the Persian Gulf.
17
Russian successes against both Persia and Turkey,
29
raised alarms in London and India. The Forward School
viewed the Russian expansion in the Caucasus as a preliminary
to further expansion in the direction of the Euphrates Valley,
30
and the eventual control of Baghdad and Basra. Control over 
the head-waters of the Gulf would provide St. Petersburg,
31
the Russophobes feared, with two objectives simultaneously. 
First, Russia would possess a warm-water outlet to the sea 
and would be in a better position than any other Great Power 
to assert eventual control over all Gulf waters. Moreover, 
it was feared, it might provide Russia with an important 
base for future operations against the British in India.
The first British-Afghan Expedition (1838) had its
Russian counterpart. Seeing the British advancing towards
Afghanistan and finding them settled there in 1839, Russia
made an abortive attempt to reach Khiva. Alexander Burnes,
British envoy at Kabul, for example, considered it as a reply
32
to the British advance into Afghanistan. Likewise, the
British saw a Russian hand behind the siege of Herat by
Persia. Russia, on the other hand, held Britain responsible
33
for the Persian unrest of 1838-39 and 1840-41. It should 
also be noted that while Britain was grappling with the 
Sind (1843), Punjab (1849), and other smaller dominions,
Russia was busy erecting fortresses in 1847-48. Each 
viewed the other's activities with suspicion.
18
There were four major routes thought to be available 
to St. Petersburg in any move towards the Persian Gulf and 
into India. Marching towards any one of these sub-regions 
was considered to be an essential prelude to an^pther... 
Britain's aim was to extend its superiority, or at least 
effective influence, over these areas in pre-emption. A brief 
survey of these probable routes will help us to examine the 
Russian strategy and priorities.
The first route passed through Khiva, down to the
O x u s , through Bokhara and thence to Kabul and Peshawar. A
variation of this route passed from Smarkand to Kilif and
34thence to Kabul. Both, Russia and Britain recognised the
35importance of Kabul. In fact, Britain at times thought 
it so important that she occupied it in 1839 and again in 
1878-79.
The second route was through northern Persia to
36
Herat and thence to Kandahar. A possible variation might
37 •
originate in Merv and thence to Herat. Perhaps the most
persistent idea that dominated the British Central Asian
proceedings was an unmovable belief that Herat was key to
38India. Herat and Kabul should not fall, directly or 
indirectly, to Russia. The protection of Herat demanded 
greater British influence in Persia.
Attached to the Herat route was the strategic 
importance of Khorasan and Seistan. Through Khorasan ran,
19
as General Politoy^v, Chief of the Russian General Staff,
had said, "the existing strategically very important roads
39
to Afghanistan". The British Government in India was
40
equally, if not more, aware of this. Control of Seist?„n
was also considered very important as Russia could employ
it as a staging area for operations against Persia,
Afghanistan and India, while British control of it would
expose Russia's southern flanks to British counter-operations
41
from Afghanistan. There was a general consensus among the
British planners that, in the words of Lord Curzon, "in no
circumstances, direct or indirect, ought Seistan to pass
42under Russian control". Moreover, it was thought by the
British to be important to the Russians as a gate to the 
43
Indian Ocean.
The third possible route originated in the upper
Oxus (Amu Darya), or Pamir, and thence descended upon Chitral
and/or Gilgit via the mountain passes ultimately to Kashmir.
Although a far-fetched possibility, it was never ruled out;
and Chitral, Gilgit, Kashmir and the surrounding dominions,
like Kalat , were gradually occupied by the British, though
they held that the route would be employed merely as a
44
diversion , and not as the main invasion line.
The fourth possible route passed down the Euphrates 
valley to Basra. From a base on the Shatt-al-Arab, it was 
thought that the Russians might proceed down the Persian
20
side of the Gulf, to the mouth of the Indus.
The viability of these propositions was hardly 
challenged. Instead, in the 1830s, when the merits of 
possible routes were being discussed, many urged that Britain 
occupy Euphrates valley before Russia did so.
RUSSIAN INTERESTS AND POLICIES
Against these fears on the British side, the 
Russian attitudes towards the Persian Gulf area and/or India 
can broadly be divided into two categories. First, that which 
subscribed to the view that the conquest of India was a desir­
able end in itself. Second, that which believed that varying 
degrees of pressures f not amounting to conquest, could serve 
as a useful leverage for obtaining the objectives of the 
Empire in the Near East. Statements by various individuals
of varying stature can be cited in favour of both schools,
45
though the former is thought to be more influential.
The Russians periodically applied pressure on the 
British, without going so far as to risk the outbreak of 
hostilities, when they needed leverage to attain objectives 
in another region. And, when a opportunity arose to attain 
a more important objective in another regiony St. Petersburg 
was more than willing to bargain away the position in Central 
Asia to get British support in the other region. In other 
words, if the British presence diminished, the Persian Gulf
21
region would be of little value to the Russians. To illustrate 
these propositions, we shall now examine this dynamic inter­
action .
In addition to Constantinople and the Turkish
Straits, it was also desirable for some Russian statemen to
secure an outlet to the sea through the Persian Gulf, while
for some it was more realistic to hope for the Persian Gulf
46than the Straits. The Russian Government, too, is said
to have entertained, from time to time, proposals for the
establishment of«r such an outlet from either Kuwait, Basra,
47
Mohmmara, Busher, Bandar Abbas or Chahbhar.
There was, however, considerable disagreement concern­
ing the character and purpose of such an outlet. Some are 
believed to have favoured merely a commercial outlet, possibly
4
a terminus for a Russian railway or pipeline, with a Consulate.
Others favoured the establishment of a commercial outlet as a
means of gaining a foothold in the Gulf which, in the future,
could provide the basis for the establishment of a Russian 
49naval base. Finally, there were some who called for the
50
immediate establishment of a naval base.
These were personal opinions and not all Russians „ 
felt that it was practical to establish an outlet in the 
Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean. Their rationale was simply 
that Russia did not have the resources necessary to maintain 
effectively any sort of outlet in the Gulf , to say nothing
22
of a base. Russia simply did not have enough naval power
or the communication network to challenge the British position
there. And, then, why should they? In economic terms the
52Gulf area had very little to offer.
The domestic, regional and international situation
during the early nineteenth century seemed to favour Russian
expansion in the direction of the Persian Gulf. Instead, in
1834, when Mohammad Shah (1834-1896) became sovereign in
Persia, St. Petersburg pledged to Britain to respect the
53independence and territorial integrity of Persia. This
54
commitment was renewed in 1838.
The English claimed that Russian expansion into the 
Euphrates Valley would mean a frontal attack on the Ottoman 
Empire. Nicholas I (1825-55),on the other hand, knew that 
the sudden collapse of the Empire would result in its 
partition between Austria, France and Britain. This would 
mean opposition against Russian claims to the Turkish Straits. 
Constantinople would, with all probability, become a free
55
port and the Black Sea would be opened to foreign shipping. 
Moreover, the Tsar feared that the claims of those Englishmen 
who felt that Britain should extend control into the Euphrates 
Valley would be strengthened if he acted quickly.
In the light of these considerations, a Russian frontal 
attack via the Euphrates Valley was not a viable policy. The 
situation, on the other hand, demanded that Russian relations
51
23
with Turkey be cultivated. Hence, two treaties between 
Russia and Turkey were signed: the Treaty of Adrianople (1828) 
and the Treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi (1830). Under the provi­
sions of these treaties the Turks agreed to close the Straits, 
in the event of a war between Russia and any other power,
to all powers but Russia. Thus Russia established a virtual
56
protectorate over the Straits. The Russians did not, there­
fore, want to initiate, especially when they might lay claims 
to the Straits in a general agrement with the European powers. 
Yet , Russia had serious reservations over their occupation by
any other power - especially by her arch enemy , "Mwr Great 
57Britain. The settlements resulting from the London Conference 
of 1840 were interpreted by the Tsar as preliminary to the 
orderly division of the Ottoman Empire.
In 1831, Count Simonovich, the Russian Minister at
Tehran, encouraged the Persian Shah to form an alliance with
Kabul and Kandahar, guaranteed by St. Petersburg. A draft
convention between the Shah of Persia and the Sardar of
Kandahar about the future of Herat was concluded, according
58
to which the Russian Government was to act as guarantor.
The British protest through its ambassador in St. Petersburg
warned that the Minister's activities would not be tolerated
by Britain. Count Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister,
replied that "The intention of the emperor ha(d) been and
(would) continue to be, not to maintain with Afghanistan
any other than commercial relations; and that his wishes
59
(had) been ill-expressed or ill-understood". Count
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Nesselrode's reply to the British note answered the
unstated fear rather than the overt complaint. He assured,
uthe idea of assailing the security and tranquility of the
state of possession of Great Britain in India has never .
presented itself to the mind of our august master". He
also emphasised the "immense distances" which separate
Russia from India, claiming that they made "any such idea
6 0
unreasonable." The case of the Persian Gulf was even less 
promising as it had little to offer in economic and political 
terms and was far more adventurous as Russia lacked any 
worthwhile naval force.
In the 1830s and 1840s almost all activity in
Central Asia was initiated by relatively small groups of
people at the official level. But in the 1850s, both England
and Russia had bigger pre-occupation. On the Russian side
it was the Crimean War (1853-56), The origins of the war
had no connection with the Gulf or India, but British and
French readiness to participate alongside Turkey created
additional problems for Russia in regard to the Mediterranean
and Middle East, as did British intention to minimise Russian
gains from its war against Turkey in the Balkans in 1877-78.
On the British side, the second military expedition to the
Persian Gulf was followed by the 1857 uprising in India - the
official circles and the Press saw Russia and Persia as
g JL
instigating these happenings. After the suppression of 
the 1857 uprising, India came directly under the control of
25
the British Crown and the years that followed were years 
of concentration on the borders.
The Crimean War, in which Britain and Russia were 
in direct conflict for the first time, slowed down the 
Russian advance into Central Asia. The need for it, never­
theless, intensified. During the war, Russian fears of 
British expansion into Central Asia increased. In 1854-55
Persia was persuaded to join the Anglo-Turkish alliance
62
against Russia. While Turkish envoys, with the encouragement 
of their British allies, were already active in Central Asia, 
British agents also appeared in 1856 in Khokand, Khiva and
Q
Turkoman. Dost Mohammad (1793-1863), the Afghan Amir,
became an official ally of the British in 1855. Soon after,
64
he occupied some territory of Bokhara.
The Russian defeat in the Crimean war culminated 
in an intensified need for a favourable solution in the 
Balkans where it had held more than a thousand miles of 
coastline on the Black Sea and possession of the mouth of 
Danube. Therefore, it was very unlikely that Russia would 
accept indefinitely the unrealistic provision in the Treaty 
of Paris (1556) that excluded her from that sea and forbade 
the construction of fortifications along its shores. Alexander
II (1855-81) merely awaited a favourable opportunity. Central 
Asia and the Gulf area were important insofar as Russian 
control of these areas contributed to the attainment of her
26
objectives in the Balkans. If the primary objective was to 
apply pressure on the British in India, any of the four 
routes to the Gulf and India would do. Naturally, the route 
which offered the least opposition would be preferred..
From this perspective, the Gulf route was the least promising, 
particularly since the British had by then consolidated their 
position t h e r e . ®
The situation in Central Asia, however, was promising.
None of the Great Powers was committed to the territorial integ-
6 Q
rity of the Khanates of Central Asia. Initial British 
interests and aspirations had been seriously reduced as a 
result of her experience in Afghanistan. The expansion of 
Empire aside, the primary Russian objective in Central Asia 
was application of pressure on the British in India in pursuit 
of objectives in the Balkans. This clearly down-graded the 
importance of the Euphrates Valley and the Persian Gulf to 
the level of the other three routes to India. Prior to the 
1860s, the Persian Gulf area was, at least in part, an end in 
itself. After the 1860s however, the entire area was a means 
to another end; the Balkan problem. This was clearly to 
continue until the mid-1880s.
The Russian advance into Central Asia has been 
attributed to a wide range of considerations. Some held that
67
'civilized' Russia had to advance against the 'half-savage'.
Outside Russia, some Englishmen also subscribed to this idea.
68
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More believed that Central Asia was so tempting that Russia
could not resist the conquest. This attraction was because of
69
a vast power-vacuum, stretching from the Caspian to the
borders of China, and Afghanistan to the edge of the great
Siberian plain. Others believed that the object of Russian
policy in Central Asia was the attainment of an outlet in the
70
Near and Middle East. A further impetus to this Russian
penetration was given by the interruption of cotton supplies
from America, due to the Civil War, and these areas could
71
substitute sources of supply.
The decision-makers in St. Petersburg undoubtedly 
would have pondered all these considerations. The power 
available, however, was largely to determine the formation 
of the strategy. In the wake of defeat in the Crimean War the 
immediate contest was Anglo-Russian rivalry, and the Franco- 
English determination to oppose Russian claims against Turkey.
In 1857, the British forced Persia to evacuate Herat 
which had finally fallen to Persian forces. This was followed
by the granting of extensive commercial privileges to British
72 ***merchants from Persia. Russian apprehsnions were further
aggravated in 1860, when Lord Lytton, the new Conservative
Viceroy in India, invigroated the British policy and sent
agents into Bokhara.
The Russians reacted to this by sending two missions 
to undo the influence Britain had gained; one to Khiva and
28
Bokhara, and the other to Afghanistan. Both failed, adding
to Russian anxiety. Nikolai Milyutin, the Minister of War,
summarizing the Russian fears, held that the occupation of
Central Asia was the only bargaining instrument Russia had
against Britain. In case of a European war, he wrote, "we
ought to particularly value the control of that region.
It would bring us to the northern borders of India. By
ruling in Khokand, we can constantly threaten England's
East Indian possessions.... this was essential... since only
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in that quarter can we be dangerous to this enemy of ours."
But this was not an easy thing to do. Memories remained of 
the 1838 Russian expedition towards Khiva, where more than 
half of the Russian force had been destroyed before reaching 
its destination. The Russian Government was therefore prepared 
to accept cheap and successful advances by the local commander 
even without express authority; but not expensive and un­
successful ones. There was, as was the case in Britain, "an 
unstated and obvious compromise between the caution of govern­
ment and the recklessness of commanders in the field beyond
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the restraints of the telegraph and the railwayJ1
Initially the direction of Russian expansion seemed 
to focus on the Oxus River. In 1865 Tashkent fell, in 1866 
Bokhara, and two years later, Smarkand. In the same year 
Krasnovodsk, on the Eastern shores of the Caspian was annexed 
as a stepping stone for future operations in Turkestan. Khiva 
fell in 1868, and in 1875, Khokand. This wave of expansions
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brought Persia and Russia face to face east of the Caspian.
From this point, the British feared, as did the
Persians, that Russia could proceed in the direction of the
78
Gulf or India, through Kabul or Herat. But on the Russian
side, it was considered that moves in that direction were
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inappropriate and adventurous. Instead, with this impressive 
record, St. Petersburg opened hostilities against the Ottoman 
Empire in April 1877.
In 1878, Russian forces swept down onto Constantinople.
Britain was committed to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire
because, other reasons aside, it had extended loans to the
80
latter amounting in 1875 to ¿200,000,000. Thus it moved
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Indian troops to Cyprus and a battle fleet to the Bosphorus.
The arrival of the British fleet at Constantinople immediately
revived the time tested strategy; Russia should apply pressure
on the British through Central Asia in support of her war
efforts in Turkeys Nicholai Milyutin, among others, is
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reported to have suggested this to the Tsar. Consequently, 
apart from extensive military manoeuvres in the area, a treaty 
was proposed with Afghanistan which provided for Russian
8 3
military aid if Afghanistan was invaded by a "foreign power", 
and the Shah 'requested' the Russian government to undertake 
the training of the Persian armed forces. It is worth mention­
ing, however, that though Russia apparently had threatened 
India through Afghanistan, yet Gock-tepe, Ashakabad and
2y
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Merv had not then fallen into Russian hands, and the Trans- 
Capian railway did not then exist. Against the concerted 
Austrian-English threats, a general European conflict was 
avoided and the Turks made peace with Russia by the Treaty 
of San Stefano (1878) which bore witness to the overwhelming 
defeat of Turkey. Thus, by the summer of 1878, the international 
situation had again changed, and military demonstrations were 
no longer desired.
Anglo-Russian relations improved as a result of the 
Congress of Berlin (June-July 1878) ^vhich was called by 
Germany to revise the Treaty of San Stefano. Because of its 
isolation, further emphasised by the establishment of the 
Triple Alliance» of Germany, Austria and Italy (1879-81),
Russia felt that war with Britain should not be risked. The 
proposed Russo-Afghan Treaty to which the English were 
opposed, therefore, was never ratified, and military prepara­
tions were halted. These sentiments were expressed by the 
War Minister himself in 1878, saying, "collision with that 
power (Britain) would be a signal for general and stubborn 
war...the support of the Afghan Amir would be fitting only 
if a break with England becomes inevitable. This is what 
we had in mind at the beginning...when we were preparing for
war. Now there can be no question of any active measure on 
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our part". Hence, the Afghan Amir Sher Ali (r. 1863-66 & 
1869-73) was not helped when he requested aid due to the 
British invasion of his country in 1878. This policy of
30
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appeasement culminated in the Russian proposal of 1882
for a joint Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission to demarcate
85
the Russo-Afghan border. Britain declined the proposal,
but accepted it two years later when St. Petersburg
• ^ •*. 86 revived it.
Feelings of mistrust and fears between Britain and
Russia, however, survived the Congress of Berlin. Both were
apprehensive of each other's activities. A Russian memorandum
of early 1880 commented on the British policy: "England is
very far from making peaceful pronouncements. On the contrary,
she still pursues against us a policy of advance; a policy
which becomes more widespread every year. Having subjugated
Asiatic Turkey, having destroyed Afghanistan, having close
ties with the Turkomans, and trying to win Persia on her side
as well, she is beginning deliberately to threaten the Caspian 
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region". The Chief of the Asiatic Department of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, I.Z. Zinoviev, is also said to have felt 
that the reason Russia was drawn eastward from the shores 
of the Caspian, was the necessity of impressing on the 
British that Russia was resolved to prevent England from 
conducting an anti-Russia policy in the Central Asian region. 
He asserted that if the British were unopposed, they would 
embark upon a "political programme which would tend towards 
the spreading of England’s influence in Central Asia to
extreme limits, to the detriment of the importance of
• 88 
Russia".
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large, stood aloof from the European affairs and ceased to
interfere in the concerns of other nations. This policy of
'hands off' had come increasingly in favour following the
Congress of Berlin. The Tsar trusted no foreign power; had
pronounced mistrust of England, and tolerated no outside
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meddling in return for his own non-interference. During 
his reign, Russia resorted to arms only once and that was 
with Afghanistan in 1885 - culminating in Russian possession 
of the Merv and Panjdeh Oasis. After 1885, the 'power-vacuum' 
of Central Asia had been filled by Russia, and boundaries with 
Persia and Afghanistan had been drawn. After the Russo-Turkish
;
war and the abandonment Sher Ali to Britain, the regional
situation had again changed, and called for demonstration in 
Central Asia.
Russian objectives had been set out in such a way 
that Central Asia was merely a means to a higher end; the 
solution of the Balkan Question. Consequently, when the external 
pressures called for a demonstration of force in Central Asia, 
the areas were selected which promised the greatest prospects 
of success.
In 1878, the area which promised greatest prospects 
centred around Kabul. A new situation was presented by the 
British involvement in Sudan. Russia, seeing England
busy there, again sought diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. 
Though exhausted by the Boer War (1899-1902) , the British were
Under Alexander III (1881-94), Russia, by and
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not prepared to let the Afghan Ameer accommodate the Russian
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request of establishing diplomatic relations. This was 
followed by rumours in 1895 of Russian troop concentration 
at K u s k , about ninety miles from Herat. It would be hardly 
surprising that the Russians were anxious to take advantage 
of Britain's loss of face in Asia, but the purpose of these 
moves, if they existed at all, is difficult to establish.
Against these fears and suspicions present on both
sides, the actual barriers imposed by geography deterred both
these great powers from undertaking adventurous military
campaigns. According to the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission
(to define the Afghan borders), the border was "...a rugged
and inaccessible spur of the Sarikal range" which carried
the boundary between Afghanistan and Russia, and entered
into "regions of perpetual snow to its junction with the
91main range. From this point, for a distance of about 
1,200 miles, the Indo-Afghan boundary (the Durand Line) ran 
south-west till it reached the Persian frontier at the 
rocky mountains of Koh-i-Malik Shah, in the inhospitable 
desert regions beyond the Helmund River. To cross these 
frontiers with the intention of invading India would be too 
reckless to undertake, especially in the absence of any 
communication network. The Trans-Caspian railway line was 
not connected with the main system, either in Europe or 
in Asia, and was completed only to Kizil-Arvat. In the 
absence of a railway between this point and Herat, the
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concentration of a significantly strong Russian force for 
the conquest of Afghanistan, let alone the invasion of India, 
was impossible.
In short, Russia was separated from India by immense 
distances of sparsely populated bleak mountain-ranges. From 
such areas the Russians simply could not obtain the supplies 
and transport necessary for the support and movement of a 
force large enough to invade India with reasonable chances 
of success. At the lowest estimate Russia would have required,
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it was estimated then, an army of 200,000 men to invade India, 
and for this force all the supplies and transport that could 
not be raised locally would have had to be brought from 
Russia.
Even if the Russians had overcome all these problems, 
which seems highly improbable, would not the Afghans have 
destroyed or removed all the supplies as they had done to 
the British army on the Helmund? Moreover, the further the 
Russian army advanced, the more the dangers of their defeat 
would have multiplied. Any Russian reverse, even the initial 
one, would have encouraged the Afghans, Persians and Turkomans 
to revolt against them. There might even have been a general 
rebellion throughout Turkistan and trans-Caspian.
Lord Mayo, the British Viceroy in India had 
summarized such a scenario that if Russia was demented 
enough to attack India, a handful of British agents and a
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few hundred thousand pounds of gold could raise the whole
of Central Asia in a holy war, and, "I could make a hotplate
93
for our friend the Bear to dance onM . Against such probable 
heavy odds, it seems improbable that the Russians would ever 
have seriously entertained the idea of invading India.
Britain's difficulties with the Boers, on the other
hand, called for radical re-appraisal of Russian strategy.
The Russian Foreign Minister was said to be convinced that
military preparedness in Central Asia should be maintained,
as the British were always impressed by that. The Cabinet,
however, is believed to have agreed that it was more important
to win control of the Bosphorous. Nevertheless, the Foreign
Minister held that when unrest did come, as it would, that
would be the time for Russia to avail itself of the opportunity
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of furthering its influence in Afghanistan.
On the British side, Lord Curzon was convinced
that Russia, with the help of France, was preparing in 1903
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for a military campaign into Persia. Convinced of Russian
advances, Lord Curzon put the Indian army on a war footing.
As against Lord Curzon's forward strategy, there was a growing
desire in London to come to terms with Russia and France in
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order to balance the growing power of Imperial Germany..
Lord Curzon, less concerned with the balance of power cal­
culations of the London Office, sent the Indian army into 
Tibet on the pretext of Russian infiltrations there.
All this was happening when the Russians were
playing cautious. One example of this is that they made no
move to put forward a candidate of their own on the death
of the Afghan Amir, Abdul Rehman (r. 1880-1901), and did
not contest pro-British Habibullah's accession to the throne
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(r. 1901-19). In fact,.St. Petersburg had now a very low
priority for affairs in Central Asia. The Russian Government
was pre-occupied instead with the internal turmoil and the
Japanese challenge in the Far East. The Russian defeat in
the Russo-Japanese war (1904-5) and the nature of the
Russian Revolution (1905-7) had significant repercussions
in the concluding years of the Great Game. Lenin, then
relatively unknown, on writing in yperyod (1 January 1905)
on "The Fall of the Port Arthur" immediately welcomed the
triumph of Japan as the triumph of "progressive" Asia over
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"backward and reactionary" Europe. The impact of the
Russian revolution in the orient was of still greater
importance. M. Pavlovitch, a leading Soviet Orientalist,
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later regarded it as the French Revolution of Asia. A 
western observer, likewise, later asserted that the 
Russian Revolution "in many respects had a stronger appeal., 
than the October Revolution". Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan 
particularly experienced the full impact of the Russian 
Revolution. These developments, togather with the Franco- 
Russian Alliance, negotiated under Alexander III (1891-94), 
paved the way for better relations with England in the
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reign of Nicolas il (1894-1917; and Russia hoped to gain 
British support concerning the Balkans.
All these factors combined to induce Russian 
statesmen to revive the proposition which had underlined 
Russian strategy throughout the nineteenth century. This 
held that Central Asia was a means to a higher end, and of 
lower priority in itself. The new Russian strategy bargained 
away the Russian position in Persia in order to gain her 
objectives in. the Near East, resulting in August 1907, in 
the Anglo-Russian Entente by which Russia recognized Afghanistan 
as a British sphere; both powers agreed to maintain a 
'hands-off' policy in Tibet; and each retained a sphere of 
influence in Persia - the Russians in the north and the 
British in the south. Thus, Russia abandoned her prevaiously 
held position of resistance to British efforts to partition 
Persia.
In retrospect, it is interesting to recall that the
Anglo-Russian partition of Persia created a new problem that
instead of constitutional government and social reforms in
Persia, the quest for liberation from Tsarist and English
'domination' became the prime consideration. Many organizations
were founded to combat foreign domination like Ittehad-e-Islam
(1912) of Mirza Kuchuk Khan, becoming prominent in the uprising
in northern Iran following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
It was this pre-occupation with national liberation that the
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Bolsheviks were able to take advantage of in 1917.
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Tsarist government's interpretation of four main 
factors leading to Anglo-Russian rapproae-hment, as summed 
up during a conference on the Afghan question, held under 
the chairmanship of A.P. Izvolsky, Russian Minister of..
Foreign Affairs, on 14 April 1907 is of particular interest: 
(1) the rapid rise of Germany forced England to change her 
traditional policy towards Russia; (2) the understanding with 
England made it easier for Russia to find a common understand­
ing with Japan, already an ally of England; (3) the common 
fear of the development of national liberation movements 
in the orient had aroused sympathetic response in a number 
of oriental countries, like Persia; (4) England's fear that 
she might loose her colonies as a result of revolution, with 
the consequent loss of prestige involved, impelled her to 
make concessions to Russia and to enlist Russian support as
10
a gendarme to help pressure order among the Asiatic peoples.
The Russian position was further elaborated by the Russian
Foreign Minister in 1907; "If Russia should be...unable to
raise her voice at such a moment of solution of European
problems, she should immediately descend to the level of a
second rate power. We must put our interest: in Asia in their
proper place, otherwise we should ourselves become an Asiatic
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state, which would be the greatest calamity for Russia".
Under this line of thinking, the agreement with Britain 
proved to be a prelude to the creation of the Triple Entente 
of Britain, Russia and France. By the out-break of the First
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World War, thus, the Russian role in the 'Central Asian 
Question' had considerably diminished.
The Russian position in Persia was further abandoned 
during the First World War when in 1915, St. Petersburg agreed 
to turn over the Neutral Zone, demorcated in 1907, to Britain. 
In return, Britain promised to support the Russian claims 
to Constantinople and the Turkish Straits. In a complete 
reversal of traditional Anglo-French policy on the Straits 
Question, the so-called Secret Agreement in regard to 
Constantinople (4 March - 10 April 1915) officially recog­
nized the right of Russia to Constantinople, and also provided 
for the transfer to her of the western part of the Bosphorpus 
coast. The Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916) , disclosed in 
1917 by the Bolsheviks, substantially extended the under­
standing reacted by England, France and Russia in 1915.
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Thus, the Russian strategy of applying prese»e-e m  one 
area to get concessions in another, applied throughout the 
nineteenth century, secured her strategic objective; Turkish 
Straits and Constantinople.
While the Russian Revolution of 1905 was only the
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"dress reh^rsal" according to Lenin , the Bolshevik Revolu­
tion of 1917 had, said Stalin, "ushered a new era, an era 
of colonial revolutions, which are carried out in the oppressed
countries of the world in alliance with the proletariat and
106
under the leadership of the proletariat". No longer accord­
ing to Stalin, would the countries of the Entente, especially
40
England, rest secure in their possession of vast colonial
areas, for the October Revolution “dealt blows at the imperial
rear, at its periphery" by undermining imperialist domination
107over colonial and dependent countries.
In view of their identification of the Bolshevik
Revolution with the national liberation movements in the
E a s t , Soviet leaders revised the traditional concept of the
Eastern Question which, as we have seem, under the Tsarist
regime had .meant applying varying degrees of pressure in an
area to secure objectives in another. The Bolshevik overtures
appeared to remove the threat of Russian expansion at the
expense of its suthern neighbours like Turkey, Iran and
Afghanistan. The Bolsheviks redefined the Eastern Question
as one which involved Soviet aid for the liberation of
enslaved peoples from domination by "England, France, the
108
United States and other capitalist countries". Thus, 
the Soviets further broadened the scope of the Eastern Question 
by including therein the problems of oppressed colonial 
peoples everywhere:
"The Orient is not only the oppressed Asiatic 
world. The orient is the entire colonial world, 
the world of the oppressed peoples...Capitalism 
draws its chief strength, not from industrial 
European countries, but from the colonial 
possessions".
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SOVIET INTERESTS AND POLICIES
Within days of the Bolsheviks' rise to power, 
a declaration on the rights of the people of Russia was issued 
for a just peace without annexations and indemnities based on 
the right of self-determination. Soon after, on 3 December 1917, 
"All the Toiling Muslims of Russia and the Orient" - among whom 
the Persians, Turks, Arabs and Hindus were mentioned specifi­
cally - were called upon to overthrow their imperialist rulers 
and to build their "national life freely and without hindrance.'*fl° 
All the secret treaties entered into by the Tsarist regime were
111
declared null and void, and all territorial claims were renounced. 
Animated with the ideological tenets as these were, the initiative, 
were also aimed at internal consolidation, external legitimacy 
and were, as one commentator later concluded, "a response to 
an outgrowth of Soviet weakness elsewhere" and largely "repre­
sented a desperate effort to break through capitalist encircle­
ment".112
The first Comintern meeting (1919) produced a manifesto
in which a section referred to a "series of open risings and
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revolutionary unrest in all colonies". The oppressed peoples 
of the world, primarily under British rule, were called upon 
to rise and join the hands with their Bolshevik counterparts 
to realize the 'world revolution1. The second Comintern Congress 
(July 1920) accepting Lenin's optimistic vision of the two 
stages of revolution in the East, called for creation of an 
international anti-imperialist front by supporting, in
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'backward* countries, the bourgeois democratic movements.
The purpose was, in immediate terms, to weaken anti-Soviet 
imperialist powers. It was hoped that nationalist , bourgeois 
revolutions in the East , if successful , would eventually result 
in socialist revolution in the industrialized Europe. The 
substance of Soviet foreign policy, therefore , was to support 
nationalist leaders , movements and governments in Asia in order 
to break Soviet diplomatic isolation on the one hand and create 
problems for anti-Soviet interventionist forces on the other.
By the end of 1920 , however, the conflict between the 
grand schemes and the adverse conditions at home became increas­
ingly apparent , leading the Bolsheviks to ask for Western aid 
and capital. An agreement was finally reached with Britain on 
the much desired trade deal. One of the conditions of the agree­
ment , signed on 16 March 1921, was that
"Each party (will) refrain from hostile action 
or undertakings against the other and from conduct­
ing outside of its own borders an official propa­
ganda , direct or indirect ,...More specificially , 
the Russian Soviet government (will) refrain from 
any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other 
form of action or propaganda to encourage any of 
the peoples of Asia in any form..."H4
The internal conditions of Soviet Russia which led to, what 
Lenin called, "concessions" to the capitalist world and the 
Anglo-Soviet trade agreement , also became the basis for the new 
Soviet foreign policy culminating almost simultaneously in 
friendship treaties with Afghanistan , Iran and Turkey , along 
Soviet southern borders. The Bolsheviks pursued this policy
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tactfully , thus avoiding the disruption of its economic 
relations with the Western capitalist world.
Lenin's "Thesis on National and Colonial Question",
adopted by the Second Comintern Congress , was echoed again in
the Baku Congress (September 1920). This came very close to
calling for a Holy War against Britain - as the old adversary ,
then encircling the southern borders, was supporting the
115counter-revolutionaries. Prior to 1921, therefore, Soviet 
neighbours like Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan were primarily
treated as one unit in Soviet diplomacy. It was so because all 
of them were Muslim and shared borders with Soviet Russia, and, 
all of them were suspicious of British activities and had 
recognized England as their common enemy. The Soviet leader­
ship, then, tried to cultivate relations with these neighbours 
in two ways: a) by disassociating itself from all Tsarist 
claims and territorial designs, b) by offering political, 
economic and military support to the nationalist leaders of 
these countries.
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Contrary to his initial involvement , Stalin showed 
no interest in bourgeois democratic or nationalist leaders of 
Asia. He held that the success of national liberation wars in 
the colonies and semi-colonies was possible only after revolution 
had occurred in Europe. He asserted, in 1928, that "there are 
occasions when the right of self-determination conflicts with 
the other, the higher right - the right of a working class 
that has assumed power to consolidate its power. In such cases,
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this must be said bluntly , the right of self-determination
cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the exercise by
117
the working class of its right to dictatorship". The Sixth 
Comintern Congress (1928), under Stalin's directions, adopted
the "Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and
118Semi Colonies" , which cautioned against "the excessively 
marked proportion between the objective revolutionary situation 
and the weakness of the subjective factor". Therefore, the 
document upheld, "it is necessary to reject the formation of 
any kind of block" between the Communist Party and reformist 
(bourgeois or national revolutionary) forces. In other words, 
revolutions in Asia could occur only as byproduct of revolutions 
in Europe. Thus, Lenin's "two-stages" formula, for revolutions - 
which had given the Soviets greater flexibility to deal with 
the situations pravelent in the Orient - was formally abandoned 
in favour of a formulation which envisaged revolution only in 
'one-stage'. Though the Seventh Cominform Congress (1935) pro­
vided for some sort of national front , this stricture remained 
in force till Stalin's death in 1953. His refusal to deal with 
the nationalist leaders was further strengthened at the inaugural 
session of the cominform, in September 1947 , when Zhadano*, 
Stalin's Chief henchman, presented the absolute dichotomy of 
"two-camps".
Thus , following the treaties of 1921 with Turkey , Iran 
and Afghanistan in a bid to sharpen their contradictions with 
England, the Soviet government turned its attention from the
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Orient to Europe. In general, from 1927 to 1941, there was 
no direct Soviet action on a large scale in these countries 
and her dealings with the East were primarily undertaken in 
such a way so as to influence developments in Europe and 
create difficulties for the colonial powers, particularly the 
British. The main reason for the comparative lull in Soviet 
activities in the area was the rise of facism. The USSR placed 
more and ra>re emphasis on non-aggression pacts with neighbouring 
countries , normalizing relations with the US , joined the League 
of Nations in 1934 and entered into an alliance in 1935. Besides, 
the desperate economic situation in the Soviet domestic front 
aggravated by famine and the failure of First Five Year Plan 
coupled with efforts at large-scale industrialization , pre­
occupied the Soviet government and deterred it from activities 
that would unduly antagonize the major colonial powers.
Turkey: Welcoming the Turkish Revolution of 1918-22 
as a counterpart of the Bolshevik Revolution , the new Soviet
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regime described it as "the first Soviet Revolution in Asia".
The Soviet leaders appear to have sensed an opportunity to make
use of the revolutionary Turkey as the vanguard of revolution
in the East, and as an ally against the Entente powers. At the
10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party in March 1921 ,
Stalin asserted: "Turkey , the most politically developed country
among the Muslim peoples , has raised the banner of revolt and
<ry 12
rallied around itself the people /(a^d the East against imperialism"
Soviet Russia not only abandoned its claims over Constantinople
in May 1917, but also dismissed Milikov, minister of foreign
-.'T— .
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affairs in the provisional government , who had refused to 
yield on Tsarist claims.
In September 1919 , the Soviet Foreign Minister,
Chicherin in a direct appeal reminded to the workers and peasants 
of Turkey that "so long as your country is led by benal Pashas...
121 r
there is no salvation for you". Chjcherin went on to invite
the Turkish toilers^to stretch forth a brotherly hand in order
to drive off the European robbers...(and) to destroy and make
powerless those within the country who are accustomed to build-
»122
ing their happiness on your misfortunes. Moscow knew
perfectly well that attempts to create a Turkish Communist Party 
were not likely to be regarded with favour by the Turks.
Ataturk , however, desperately needed help and support which he 
found nowhere but in Soviet Russia: whereas Moscow was helping 
a bourgeois nationalist leader to consolidate, Ataturk, at 
least for a while, showed a degree of tolerance at Moscow's 
direct overtures to the peasants and workers. Against this 
backdrop the Turkish appeal "to coordinate labours and military 
operations against the imperialist governments" did not create 
enthusiasm on the Bolsheviks* side partly because they did not 
trust the Turkish nationalists of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois 
origin as was also reflected later in the September 1920 Baku
1 oo
Conference, and partly because they could not afford to fight
on one more front. Thus, Chicherin*s reply to Kemal Ataturk on
124
2 June 1920 made no mention of a common military action.
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Growing Bolshevik maturity was reflected in their 
concern with the consolidation of a strong national government 
in Turkey as the promise of that country's independence against 
Western tutelage. In the Fourth Congress of the Comintern 
(November 1922), the Turkish delegates' complaining of government 
repression in Turkey were commended to support the nationalist 
movement in any case. In the 12th Russian Communist Party 
Congress (April 1923) Bukharin restating the Soviet position 
towards Turkey said: "Turkey, in spite of all persecutions of 
communists, plays a revolutionary role, since she is a destruc­
tive instrument in relation to the imperialist system as a
. „125 whole".
In line with this friendly diplomatic appeal and the
Soviet military aid programme to Turkey, M.W. Frunze (the
commander of the Ukranian Red Army) visited Turkey in the winter
of 1021 and reassured the Turks that the Russians would not try
to Bolshevize Turkey and recognized that a strong Turkish state
would be a most satisfactory guarantee to the security of
Soviet borders. His mission led to Russian aid the same year,
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the precise quantity of which is still largely unknown.
Relations further improved as this marked the beginning of, and 
set the tone of, Turko-Soviet relations that lasted until the 
eve of the Second World War as keystone of Kemalist foreign 
policy.
It can be argued that the Turkish Revolution and for 
some time thereafter, the character of Turkish relations with
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the Soviets was contingent upon the policy of Entente powers 
towards Turkey. In other words, whenever the Turks were hard 
pressed by the Entente and threatened with dismemberment of 
their country, they returned inevitably to the USSR for support.
On the other hand, in proportion as the Entente powers ceased 
their pressure and displayed a willingness to compromise, the 
Soviet-Turkish rapproachment cooled off appreciably.
The alacrity with which the Soviets responded to the
Turkish note of 11 April 1936 , calling for the revision of the
Laasanne Treaty (1923) and particularly to the abrogation of
those clauses providing for the demilitarization of the Straits,
was typical of the Soviet policy of normalization of relations
with neighbouring countries during the period. The subsequent
Montreux Convention of 1936 (signed on 20 July 1936) granted
Turkey complete sovereignty over the Straits, permitting her
to close them to the warships of all nations in the interests
of her own security. The USSR was well satisfied with the
convention as it safeguarded Soviet exit to the Mediterranean
and restricted the naval power of potential enemies in the
Black Sea. By the mid-1940s, however, a change in Soviet view
was visible as it was stated in 1945: "In spite of some short
comings in the convention, its acceptance was tremendous victory
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for Soviet diplomacy". At the end of World War II, however,
the USSR demanded the revision of the Montreux Convention because,
Moscow charged, it conferred on Turkey the exclusive right to
control the Straits to interpret the convention and implement
128it unilaterally. Stalin not only sought revision of the
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Convention and possibly a Soviet base on the Straits, but
also hinted at the possible revival of Soviet territorial
claims in respect of the Kars and Ardahan areas of Eastern
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Turkey. These relatively crude attempts at territorial 
aggrandizement were counterproductive as in response Turkey 
found itself in alliance with the very powers the Bolsheviks 
had been helping her to fight with.
Iran: Konstantin Troyanovsky , a Soviet writer, called
Iran in 1918 as the "citadel of revolution in the East". He
held that tie Persian revolution "may become the key to the
revolution of the whole Orient... just as Egypt and Suez Canal
are the key to English domination in the Orient , Persia is the
Suez canal of the Revolution. By shifting the political centre
of gravity of the Revolution to Persia, the entire strategic
130value of the Suez canal is lost...". In other words, a 
revolution in Persia was desired, first and foremost, to 
eliminate the British presence. from the area. Though the 
degrees of involvement fluctuated over time, this objective 
nevertheless captures the central theme of Soviet interests and 
policies during the period.
Shortly after the appeal to All Muslims of Russia and 
the East, and in line with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (15 December 
1917) between the Bolsheviks and the central powers, the Soviets 
started withdrawing their forces. The English were quick to fill 
the 'vacuum* created by the departure of Soviet and Turkish forces, 
and occupied all of Persia using it as a base of operations against
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the Bolsheviks in Transcaucasia and Turkestan. Later on, in 
August 1919 , an Anglo-Iranian treaty was signed which trans­
formed the latter into a British protectorate. The Iranian 
Majlis, however, did not ratify the treaty and Iran (like 
the Turks after the Treaty of Sevres, and, Afghans during the 
Third Anglo-Afghan war) turned to Soviet Russia for support.
According to Soviet sources, under the impetus of the 
October Revolution, there was an upsurge in the national libera­
tion movement in northern Iran, especially in Resht and Enzcli 
(Pahlevi) and the Shah's governors were removed and local
Soviets were established in Gilan by forces headed by Mirza
131Kauchik Khan and Ehsanullah Khan. The class composition
and the need to secure a united front demanded that , in line 
with the Third International guidelines, the Communist programme 
be subordinated to local issues in order to concentrate on the 
one objective common to all - the expulsion of the English 
from Iran. In absence of strong and influential communists, the 
Soviets understandably supported the nationalist Islamic reformist 
movement. Fighting since 1917, but finding themselves in difficult 
situation, they appealed for help to the Soviets in 1919. The 
Persian Socialist Republic in Gilan was finally established on
4 June 1920, all this coinciding with Persian-Soviet negotiations 
to establish diplomatic and trade relations.
To Persian protests on Soviet help, the Bolsheviks 
denied that there were any Soviet troops involved, only those 
of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. Yet, the Bolsheviks showed
- -■ ■-------- n- , ■, -m—irnmji .i»n. .m
46d
willingness to try to influence the Republic to withdraw its
forces from Persia provided the British would do likewise.
Moreover, Moscow also declined English overtures to once again
132partition Persia along the 1907 treaty lines. Finally,
England finding it difficult to control whole of Persia, 
withdrew its forces in May 1921, to be followed by Soviet 
evacuations completing in September. This made way for Reza 
Khan's forces to enter Gilan, where upon the Gilan Republic came 
to an end within days. It can be argued that the Soviet support 
for "bou^eois democratic" movement of Kaachik Khan was to sharpen 
still further the strong anti-British feelings then prevailing 
in Tehran. Y/ith the establishment of relations with Persia, the 
signing of friendship treaty, and the evacuation of British 
troops, the Soviets found it more advantageous to end their 
military presence in Gilan. The proposition, it appears, was 
simple; If the Bolsheviks remained in Gilan , the British would 
continue to occupy the South.
Reza Khan took control of Tehran on 21 February 1921,
and signed a treaty of friendship with Soviet Russia on 26 February
1921, on the same day that the 1919 treaty with Britain was
formally renounced. The Friendship treaty, as it had been set
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out earlier in a Soviet note of 26 July 1919 , renounced all 
Tsarist privileges and concessions. Article VI of the treaty 
gave Soviet Russia right "to advance its troops into the Persian 
interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations 
necessary for its defence". In October 1927, a non-aggression
46e
and neutrality treaty was signed prohibiting political alliances
or agreements directed against the "safety of the territory of
territorial waters of the other contracting party or its integrity,
134
independencebr sovereignty". Originally directed against the 
activities of ‘white1 Russians in Persia, the Soviets invoked 
the treaty in 1950.T charging that the ties established with the 
US (CENTO) were in violation of this and the 1921 treaty. The 
main objective evidently was the elimination of British, and 
later in 1950s, the American influence.
135In the Rise of Reza Khan, the Soviets saw the rise
of a national liberation movement of "an anti-imperialist character"
characterizing a turn from feudalism to capitalism, representing
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a nationalism primarily directed against Britain. Thus, Soviet
trade (particularly with Iran's northern provinces) expanded
rapidly, and with the completion of trans-Iranian railways, the
USSR in 19305 came to occupy first place in Iran's foreign trade.
From late 1930s onwards, however, Nazi Germany started replacing
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USSR as Iran's Trading partner. The Soviets responded by 
further increasing their attention on developments in Europe.
During the World War II, though Reza Khan declared 
his country's neutrality, but tended to favour Germany especially 
by refusing to expel Germans from the territory and permitting 
Iran to be used as a route for transportj^of Western aid to the 
Soviet Union. The Gulf route had acquired strategic importance 
for the western supplies to the USSR by its western allies.
This led to Soviet and British forces, now allies in a common
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war against Nazi Germany, to enter Iran on 25 August 1941 and 
force Reza Khan to abdicate in favour of his son Mohammad Reza 
Pehlavi. The British-Soviet occupation was formalized by a treaty 
of allies between UK, USSR and Iran (January 1942), ensuring 
respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and political 
independence of Iran, and declared that all occupant forces would 
withdraw their forces within six months of the end of the war. 
Despite the declarations of the Tehran Conference (28 November-
1 December 1943) between Roosevelt, Churchil and Stalin, the 
Soviets, however, were reluctant to withdraw their forces. Instead, 
the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People's 
Republic were established in the Soviet occupied areas on 12 and
15 December 1945 respectively. The Iranian Prime Minister in 
order to secure the withdrawal of Soviet troops, signed an agree­
ment establishing a joint Soviet-Iranian company (51% Soviet shares) 
to exploit northern Iran's oil reserves, gave the Tudeh Party 
three ministerial level portfolios in the central cabinet and
promised to enter into negotiations with the Azerbaijan Demo-
138cratic Party, recognizing it as the legal principal government.
The Tudeh Party which was established in January 1942, though
was particularly strong in Azerbaijan and other industrialized
and Soviet occupied areas, was weakened by the establishment
(September 1945) of Azerbaijan Democratic Party. Paradoxically,
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the Soviets gave the ADP more influential role. All this 
resulted in Soviet troop evacuation in May 1946, and within a 
few months, the collapse of the two republics. Iranian Majlis, 
as it had done earlier in 1919 on the issue Anglo-Persian treaty,
refused to ratify the agreement on 22 October 1947. It is worth- 
mentioning that Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq was then leading the 
Majlis and was soon to get Soviet support over the oil nationali­
zation issue (1951-1953) against Britain and the United States. 
Mossadeq was a millionaire landlord, "a bourgeois nationalist", 
and Stalin trusted, if any one, only the Communists, yet he 
extended Soviet support because he did not want Mossadeq to 
replace, in Soviet view, the declining British power with the 
rising American influence in the area. ^
After Mossadeq*s refusal to renew Soviet fishing 
concessions in the southern Capsian, Stalin's suspician of 
Mossadeq increased considerably and contributed to his decision 
not to support him directly and act through the Tudeh Party 
against his arch rival - the Great Britain. Stalin died in 
March, whereas the Shah was forced to leave Iran in August 1953.
Sci'itr
The new'leadership, responding cautiously, could not grapple
,*N
with opportunities available to the Tudeh Party from April to 
August 1953. This caution, however, made it possible to sign a 
trade agreement with Iran in September 1953 and in December 1954 
on exchange of certain border areas.
Afghanistan: When the Soviet Russia withdrew its 
forces from Persia in March 1918, the British quickly occupied 
not only the whole of Persia but also entered in the Russian
Central Asia. The Afghans saw in these British moves first a 
complete encirclement to be followed by -frfee inevitably loading 
fce complete liquidation. The Afghans were, therefore, favourably
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disposed towards the Soviet moves of renunciation of all Tsarist 
territorial claims and unequal treaties, and had welcomed the 
Brest-Litovsk peace treaty of 3 March 1918.
After pro-British Habibullah's (r. 1901-1919) assassi­
nation on 21 February 1919, and in the wake of sharp criticism 
of him by the young Afghans, the new Afghan Amir, King Amanullah 
(r. 1919-1929) within a week announced that "Afghanistan would
henceforth be a free and independent country which recognizes
141no foreign domination over it". Sensing the anti-British 
character of this declaration the Bolsheviks were the first to 
extend recognition of the full sovereignty of the Afghan state 
on 27 March 1919. A few days later, the Soviet Russia sent to 
the participants of the Paris Peace Conference a document contain­
ing the conditions for concluding peace with Soviet Russia, of
which the first was the mutual obligation of all states not to
142use force to subvert the legal government of Afghanistan.
These initial moves provided sufficient ground to initiate, on
the highest level, diplomatic correspondence. Calling Bolsheviks
as the "friends of humanity" who had "voiced the principle of
the freedom of equality of nations and peoples of the whole
143
world", King Amanullah on 7 April 1919, sent a personal 
message to Lenin. A similar letter was sent by the Afghan Foreign 
Minister, Mahmood T a r z i , to his Soviet counterpart, G.V. Chicherin. 
Three weeks later, on 21 April, Amanullah sent another delegation 
to prepare the ground for establishing the necessary friendship 
between the two governments. Central Asia then had yet to be
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Bolshevized and Afghanistan was faced with the Third Anglo-
Afghan war. Lenin, in order to win Amanullah, replied on 27 May
1919 that "an attempt by Afghanistan to follow the Russian
example would be the best guarantee of strength and independence
144of the Afghan state". He further stressed that "the establish­
ment of permanent diplomatic relations between the two people 
will open broad opportunities for mutual help against any encroach­
ment on the part of foreign predators on others' freedom of
• 145 possession".
Not used to such a favourable reply by a great power,
Amanullah felt indebted to the Soviets not only for such a reply
but also for turning back, in the spring of 1919, the attack in
Turkestan and forcing the British command to abandon the plans
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of opening another front against Afghanistan from the north.
By the Treaty of Rawalpindi (8 August 1919), within two months 
of the termination of war and coinciding with the Soviet consoli­
dation in Central Asia, the British accepted Afghanistan's 
independence in internal as well as in external affairs. Later, 
on 14 October, Lenin in an apparent bid to win Amanullah and 
question British position in the East, was reported to have 
stressed that insofar as Afghanistan was the only independent M k.Juv* 
state in the world, the "great historical task befell on it of
unifying around itself all the enslaved Muslim nations and
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leading them on the path of freedom and independence".
Encouraged by the friendlier gestures, Amanullah in May 1920
(V
requested general assistance from Moscow as well as commercial
46 j
treaty. By September 1920 the two sides initiated the first text 
of the treaty which was finally signed on 28 February 1921 - 
two days before a similar treaty was signed with Persia. The 
first Soviet military and financial assistance began in 1919
with several subsidies, followed by a gift of 13 airplanes,
r?//stT
plus po l i t s , mechanics, transportation specialists and telegraph
operators. Before 1928, the USSR established an air route for
148Moscow to Kabul via Tashkent. Modest in quantity but signifi­
cant in political terms, the Soviet aid reduced Afghanistan's 
critical dependence for personal subsidies and transit rights 
on the British India.
Nevertheless, Soviet annexations of Khiva and Bukhara,
involvement in Iran in May 1920, and perceived involvement in
the creation and activities of democratic organizations in
149Afghanistan cautioned King Amanullah. The Afghan King welcomed
the Bukharan Amir as a state guest in March 1921. Feeling threatened 
by Soviet consolidation in Central Asia, an area where Amanullah 
himself was nursing the idea of confederation under his leader­
ship, he signed an agreement with British in November 1921 in 
an effort to counter-balance.
The relationship between the two countries in the
inter-war period (1919-1939) was governed primarily by the
security concerns of the both and then of the Soviet government
which feared the use of Afghan territory by Nazi Germany for an
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attack on the vulnerable Soviet Asian flank. It was, however, 
not until the death of Stalin that the Soviet leadership began
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its policy of economic and political involvement in response, 
at least in part , to Pakistani , Iranian and Turkish decision 
to join the American led Baghdad Pact.
The sharp decline of Soviet influence in this period
can be measured from the fact that the very states Soviet Russia
had counted upon - Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan - joined with
151
Iraq in July 1937, in Tehran to conclude the Saadabad Pact,
after the s e t t l e m e n t I r a n - I r a q  boundry dispute. Moscow viewed
s'Near Eastern Entente1 as a British scheme to create a chain
of alliances along the southern Soviet border and to ensure
joint action on the part of the member countries to stemp out
152the national liberation movement. It later served as a 
pattern for the Baghdad Pact (1955).
In the 1930s there appeared in the area German secret
agents in Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, with the alleged object of
creating bases for an ultimate attack on the USSR. While Iran
remained an area of intense activity a2k Nazi agents, they were
also strong in Egypt and Iraq. Nazi propaganda appealed to the
Muslims to join forces with the Nazis under the leadership of
153Führer against Comintern. The success of the Nazi propaganda
campaign was reflected in the spectacular increase in German-
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Iranian trade, at the cost of Soviet Iranian trade. On the 
other hand, British colonial authorities appear to have evinced 
a considerable degree of tolerance towards the Nazis in their 
colonies as the British regarded the USSR as a greater potential
threat than the Germans. On the other side,as we have seen, 
ttre frhat the initial Soviet concern about the British
presence along its southern borders was replaced first by 
Nazi Germans and after the World War II, the United States.
CHAPTER-2
SOVIET VIEW OF THE THIRD WORLD
The 1960s were marked by a new phase in Soviet 
policy towards the Persian Gulf. Developments particular to 
the region apart, this was in line with a general doctrinal 
re-appraisal of the newly independent countries. The purpose 
of this section is to bring into perspective the doctrinal 
contours within which the Soviet leaders explain their policies 
towards the "Third World". Without going deeply into the 
details of doctrinal intricacies, an attempt is made to high­
light the revolutionary-in-appearance patterns within which 
Soviet actions, or lack of them, are justified. Given the 
flexibility inherent in the Soviet official ideology,
'power-politics' may be explained as an indivisible part of 
ideology. The nature of questions from Lenin's time has been 
the same: How much weight ought to be given to the 'subjective' 
factors against the 'objective' conditions? What should be 
the criteria and extent of support for wars of national 
liberation? And at what cost?
The concept of national liberation is the single 
most powerful ideological tenet providing the Soviets with a 
perspective for their relations with the developing countries.
Its guiding principles are traced from Lenin's writings.1 
The 'victorious' proletariat is held duty-bound to consoli­
date its gains and continue strengthening itself internationally.
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Capitalizing on the inherent contradictions of capitalism 
is thought to be one way of achieving these objectives, as 
is helping the wars of national liberation. The entire pers­
pective is double-edged: it aims at not only abandoning wars 
with the capitalist bloc and gathering dividends peacefully, 
but also at transforming it eventually into the socialist 
system. The revolutions in the Third World, it is hoped, 
will hasten the inevitable process of history. In the 
absence of a fixed time-table, the time scale is flexible.
Stalin's time was the most restrictive in ideological
i*
terms. His pre-occupations are described in Socialism in one 
" 2
country. He refused to acknowledge national liberation struggles 
and national revolutionary leaders. His formula was a simple 
one: once the national bourgeoisie had assumed political power 
and had become the ruling class, it was no longer capable 
of playing a revolutionary role. He theoretically justified 
support to bourgeois nationalist movements, but refused to 
deal with their governments. As for nationalist governments, 
these were not independent at all; their independence was 
considered to be phoney, and their leaders were seen as 
agents of imperialism. Soviet interests in Afro-Asia declined 
and relations became increasingly strained. In the words of 
Deutscher, "Stalinism neglected and then suppressed...inter­
nationalism, and it sought to elevate the isolation of the
Russian revolution to a virtue and a theoretical principle".
3
4The impulse for change can be traced back to 1949.
It was in 1952, however, that the 19th Party Congress put 
together, sometimes mutually exclusive, stirrings of the
5
previous years. But any substantial change in policy had 
to await Khrushchev*s advent to power in the hey-day of 
the Cold War.
In his turn, Khrushchev undertook new policy initia­
tives soon after assuming the role of the First Secretary 
of the Party. Prepared to respond to developments on the 
world scene, and particularly in the 'Third World', Khrushchev 
gave his blessing to nationalist governments. As for ideologi­
cal re-appraisal, this started with the 20th Party Congress 
of 1956, but it was not until 1960-61 that it got its final 
shape. The new doctrinal innovations had to take into account 
not only the attacks from within and from China, but also the 
new stage of development which the progressive regimes had
attained in the U.A.R. , Burma, Guinsa, Ghana, Mali and later
6
in Cuba and Algeria. Underlying the immense optimism that 
the newly born countries could be lined-up in a joint anti­
imperialist struggle, was the Khrushchevian endeavour to 
exploit the 'subjective' conditions.
At the 20th Party Congress, the Staliri-st "two-camps" 
formula was abandoned in favour of a demarcation of the world 
into 'two-zones'. The idea of peaceful co-existence was eleva­
ted from the tactical plane, where it had been since Lenin's 
time, to the doctrinal level. The competition between capitalism
50
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and socialism was now to be carried out on the economic 
front. This broader framework was in line with a slogan 
issued for the first May Day after Stalin's death: "There 
is no controversial or unresolved question which cannot, be 
solved by peaceful means, through mutual negotiations of 
interested parties". This orilientation was also designed 
to win the developing countries to the Soviet side. In deliver­
ing the Central Committee Report to the 20th Congress ,
Khrushchev asserted that the zone of peace now "'Smbraces 
tremendous expanses of the globe inhabited by nearly 1,500,000,000
g
people - that is, the majority of the population of our planet". 
This ambitious policy re-orientation demanded many 'concessions' 
vis-a-vis the bourgeois nationalist leaders.
Nationalism, for the first time, was regarded as 
a positive force in the developing countries. The progressive 
aspects of 'state nationalism' were seen as distinguishable 
from the reactionary aspects of 'tribal nationalism'. New 
evaluations, acknowledging the positive aspects of the 
phenomenon, urged their utilization as long as they played
9
a progressive, anti-imperialist role.
The re-appraisal can be seen from the writings of 
one Middle-East expert, L. Votolina. In 1955 she asserted 
that only the proletariat could lead the national liberation 
movement; "the bourgeoisie had tried out at times to put 
itself at the head of the movement, but (in) wavering and 
(being) inclined to compromise with imperialism, it had
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shown itself incapable of leadership11. ^  A year later she 
changed her position to maintain that the "active and wide­
spread participation of the bourgeoisie in the national 
liberation struggle was a characteristic feature of the 
anti-imperialist battle in the Middle East; the national 
bourgeoise had grown much stronger, whereas the proletariat 
was only beginning to play the role of a vanguard".^ Brutents, 
a prolific writer, went a step further and declared that
the revolutionary democrats express the interests of the
12
masses.
Though the developing countries lacked a proletariat,
it was held, they could still adopt a socialist orientation,
and the international socialist system could be substituted
for the role of the working class. Great hopes were built
up by the national liberation wars which were intermingled
with "Scientific Socialism". These hopes led the Meeting
of Communist and Worker's Parties in 1960 to declare: "The
impact of the national liberation movement is a development
ranking second in historical importance only to the formation
13of the world socialist system". Brutents further explained 
that the leading role of the internationalist proletariat 
"naturally does not put it 'above' the forces of national 
liberation. It merely gives it one privilege - to be the 
organizer of the (national liberation) struggle... the national 
liberation movement is an important and idependent force of
14
historical progress". The same commentator added a few 
years later that national liberation revolutions "being
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an organic part of this (transition to socialism) world-wide
process, are intricately anti-imperialist in nature. Their
historic mission is...to pave the way for the socialist
remarking of history11. He claimed that, ‘'the epoch of
transition from Capitalism to Socialism on a world-wide
scale, and the social processes in the newly independent
15countries, cannot be isolated from this transition11.
The concept of the 'national front' was broadened
to its extreme limits. The Congress of 81 Parties declared
the 'alliance of the working class and peasantry1 as the
most important force within a broad national front of
"all elements of the nation prepared to fight for national
16independence against imperialism". Later, the concept was 
further broadened to include "support from all persons at
17
all levels of society, as long as they opposed imperialism".
The transition from a state of national democracy to socialism
18
was hoped to be non-violent, and sometimes even parliamentary.
The Manifesto of 81 Communist Parties declared, "the people
of all colonial countries win their independence both through
armed struggle and non-revolutionary methods, depending on the
19
specific conditions of the country concerned". The road 
to their national independence was through 'national democracy'.
The Congress of 81 Communist Parties brought into 
focus the doctrine of 'national democracy'. This was further 
elaborated a year later, at the 22nd Party Congress. National 
democracy was held to be a higher phase of the national
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liberation movement, in which the national bourgeoisie
is compelled to share power with other forces. A national
democratic state, it was recommended, must fight against
imperialism and feudalism, for its political and economic
independence. It must "reject dictatorial and despotic
methods of government", and it must give its people "broad
political rights and liberties" (including the formation
of Communist parties), to "participate in shaping government
20policy", and "to work for agrarian reforsm". It was not 
a programme for a socialist revolution; rather a transitory
phase "consistent completion of anti-imperialist, -an-t-i -
____ 21
, anti-feudal, democratic revolution". It was
the duty of the local Communist parties to create such
national democracies, by accepting a subordinate role,
and by helping the bourgeois nationalist leaders to travel
22
along the 'non-capitalist p a t h 1 of development.
The non-capitalist way of development was explained 
more in economic terms than socially or politically. This was 
a status attributed to the states occupying a special place 
in each system, forming a special sector of the world economy, 
which was no longer capitalist, but at the same time, not 
yet socialist. It aspired to the attainment of economic 
independence to supplement the political independence of 
the newly independent countries. To go along this path was 
possible only in the conditions of industrialization in the 
state sector. Unlike monopoly capitalism, this state capitalism 
was viewed as a progressive force. In the words of a writer w
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Osnovy Marksizma, "in the countries of the East, State
Capitalism in its present form is not a tool of imperialist
monopolies, on the contrary it stimulates an anti-imperialist
23
movement". To a more ambitious commentator like Brutents,
24 •'
it was "a specific form of transition to socialism". The 
non-capitalist path of development could only be adopted 
with the aid and assistance of the Soviet U n i o n , and 
progressively diminishing reliance on the Capitalist bloc.
Such a programme of industrialization in Khrushchev's 
days, essentially meant the establishment of heavy and basic 
industries in the state sector. It was envisaged that these 
prestigious projects would create a working class and thus 
lay the foundations of future socialism. The supply of arms, 
especially after 1965, was not ruled out. Some scope was 
also conceded to the private sector and imperialist aid 
from the West.
Of the regimes which were declared 'progressive' in
the early 1960s - Guinea, Ghana, Mali, the UAR and Algeria -
none had accepted, ipso f a c t o , the notion of 'national
democracy'. Instead, they practically rejected the idea of
allowing the communist parties to function openly, let alone
participate in governmental decision-making. By early 1963,
the Communist parties in these countries had even been banned,
25
in favour of One Party Systems. At the same time, however, 
some of these regimes also inaugurated measures for the 
nationalization of capital, domestic and foreign, and under­
took some internal socio-economic reforms aimed at social
revolution. They were also willing to meet another pre­
condition: rely on the support of the Soviet bloc (sometimes 
inevitably, as the Western bloc was denying it). In other 
words, even without the existence of legal Communist parties, 
these regimes were prepared to walk along the non-capitalist 
way of development. Soon they also started claiming that 
they were building their own brands (African, Arab, etc.) 
of socialism.
26
Khrushchev's reactions, dissident opinions and
some of his own flamboyant statements apart, were still
27
favourable. Considering that the economic reforms undertaken 
by these countries were more radical than the theories eluci­
dating them, the bourgeois nationalist leaders were still 
playing a progressive role. Mirsky held that their revolution 
"can immediately break the framework of bourgeois democratic 
revolution", and that "if the conditions for proletarian 
leadership have not yet matured, the historic mission can 
be carried out by elements close to the political, military
and economic requisites for the continuous advance of the
28national liberation revolution". Brutents, after criticizing,
the local brands of socialism, maintained: "Though at times
infected with nationalistic and other prejudices, they
reflect the militant democratic sentiments of the masses,
profound hatred of capitalism, warm sympathy with the people's
sufferings, and a desire to give them a better life. Such
theories are capble of serving, not as antipodes to scientific
29
socialism, but as a step towards it". Khrushchev, in his
d6
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endeavour to exploit the subjective conditions, had already 
declared in 1961 that to lead all other Communist parties
from a single country "is both impossible and unnecessary". 
Later, he claimed, "today practically any country, irrespec­
tive of its level of development, can enter on the road
31
leading to socialism". The only political requirement 
from these nationalist bourgeois leaders was internal 
democracy for the progressive elements, but not necessarily 
for the Communist parties. Theorizing on the type of non­
capitalist path which these countries had followed, this 
was explained that they were 'revolutionary democratic1 
states. Instead of alienating themselves from the masses 
by opposing these nationalist leaders, the local communists 
were urged to play the role of their friend and assistant. 
They were even encouraged to join these progressive parties. 
On the external front, the strengthening of socio-political 
and economic ties, and "close alliance and co-operation" 
with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which
were "helping them to resist imperialist pressure" was
32
"an important condition for their struggle". This is how 
these regimes were extended with extensive support, political 
as well as economic.
The assumptions underlying Khrushchev's optimism
were never immune to criticism. An under-current of dissident
33
opinion seems to have gained ground from about 1962-1963.
Particularly disillusioned were those who hoped to reap
34
dividends immediately. Only a very small, and even that
30
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insignificant, number of developing countries, decided to
travel the non-capitalist path. N.A. Simoniya, for example,
noted that most of the Afro-Asian countries have actually
chosen the capitalist road. Thus, "one cannot speak of
growing into socialism" as the "prevalent tendency" in the
35
development of national liberation revolutions. It should
be noted that Simoniya was not the only Soviet expert to
.. . . . 36express this pessimism.
Of those who had professed the non-capitalist path, 
most were overthrown by military coups in less than a 
decade - Ben Bella (Algeria) , Keita (Mali) , Nkrumah (Ghana) 
and Sukarno (Indonesia). This led the ideologues to underline 
the importance of 'vanguard' parties, within the existing 
popular parties or independently. These could institutionalize 
the revolutionary policies of the individual leaders after 
their disappearance or betrayal. V. Kudryavtsev, for example, 
expressed this disillusionment in Izvestiya (December 11,
1966) that in the developing countries"... the subjective 
factor had great and sometimes decisive significance; that 
is, the devotion to the idea of socialism of the state 
leaders...whose power is enormous and whose authority is 
unquestioned... if for certain reasons the leader decides 
to turn the helm of the leadership to the right, or if he
37
is over-thrown, a serious threat to revolution arises..."
These events had also brought into focus the threat to the 
continued success of the non-capitalist way caused by domestic 
political instability. The weakness of the policy which reliec
heavily on a single (charismatic) nationalist leader,
38
demanded a more cautious and enduring policy. The question 
was: are these nationalist leaders worth the drain on the 
Soviet economy to the extent Khrushchev had promised?
The experience had shown that the class character
of different interacting forces needed a thorough re-assessment.
It was felt that it was "difficult to generalize socio-economic
developments" in the Third World. It was also acknowledged
that "it was only in relatively recent times" that the study
of the "diverse forms and methods of class struggle in the
39
Third World had begun. The new leadership, aware of these 
limitations, entertained a rigorous and detailed analysis 
of the 'subjective' conditions prevailing in the dev doping 
countries. Displaying less enthusiasm to create subjective 
conditions hurriedly, the new leadership placed an emphasis 
on availing itself of more opportunities - and that, without 
undertaking many risks.
It can also be suggested that by the mid-1960s -
there was relatively less urgency to pretend and project the
USSR as a desperate superpower running after clients. As
Brezhnev had said, the International Socialist System had
reached 'the stage of mat u r i t y 1. The Brezhnev-Kosygin style
of leadershipnalso coincided with the severe economic problems
40
in the 7- Year Plan(1959-1965)in the internal front, and
detente on the international level.
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Broadly working within the Khrushchevian frame­
work, the new leadership showed a more restrained and less
wishful attitude towards the national liberation struggle.
The progressive nature of the revolutionary democracies and
the gains the non-capitalist path had made were still hailed,
but not without ambivalence and reservations. The concept
of the 'national front' was upheld, "the utility of all
patriotic and democratic forces is still the most important
requisite for the success of this (national liberation)
struggle. It becomes an objective necessity because (of)
42
imperialism and neo-colonialsim..." The primacy of the
ideological work, however, was thought to be fundamentally
important for socialist development. But in the absence of
a strong proletariat, bourgeois nationalist leaders were
to continue playing their leading role with ever-increasing
43
ties with the victorious proletariat. This was affirmed
by the 23rd Party Congress in 1966, "experience shows that
the struggle for social progress and national independence,
where there is greater unity of all patriotic and democratic
forces". Under revolutionary leadership, the U.A.R. , Alegeria,
Guinea, Burma, Congo (Brazzaville) had carried out, it was
declared, "important social transformations", and had
44
"taken the socialist path".
There was a strengthening of demarcation between 
the roles of the working class and the national bourgeoisie. 
The immediate task of national fronts was the eradication
41
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of imperialistic influence by undertaking reforms internally 
and by strengthening relations with the Socialist countries 
externally.
"Only strong unity...on an anti-imperialist 
basis...and their close alliance with the Soviet Union and
4
other socialist countries can bring their tasks to fulfilment".
It was underlined, however, that the bourgeois nationalist
parties, despite their progressive role, would not substitute
46
the politically 'conscious' role of the working class.
Pravda passed this judgement in 1969 that, "Life has proved 
that the task of national democratic revolution... cannot be
47
carried out under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie I'
Pravda also proclaimed that it was "first of all the peoples
of the young national states who can put an end to all forms
of colonialism and raise the economy and culture of these
countries... The socialist countries... cannot take the
place of the peoples of the young national states in solving
48
the tasks of the national liberation movement". The Kommunist 
declared the same year that the "transition to the socialist 
stage is possible only as a result of revolutionary trans­
formations affected in the course of the working c l a s s ,
headed by a genuinely revolutionary party, armed with a
49
proletarian ideology".
As for local brands of socialism, there are no
50
socialisms but "universal scientific socialism". The 
revolutionary role can be played, it was held, by the classes
b2
other than the working class. While the national bourgeoisie
"could be admitted" into the national democratic front, the
leadership of the front "must be in the hands of the worker-
peasant alliance...or democratic intellectuals who accept
51
Marxism-Leninism".
That the revolutionary role of the national fronts
was upheld can be seen in the Basic Document adopted by the
1969 Moscow Conference of Communist and Worker's Parties.
It observed, "our era is an era of transition from capitalism
to socialism... the role of the revolutionary democratic forces
has grown...(it) offers the possibility of eliminating the
backwardness... and creating the conditions for the transition
52
to socialist development". This thesis was again upheld
by the 24th Party Congress in 1974, which stated that the
struggle against imperialism "largely depends on the cohesion
of the anti-imperialist forces, (and) above all of the World
53
Communist Movement".
One finds that the principal requisites did not
54
include the functionary role for the Communist parties. In 
the absence of the 'vanguard' parties, the revolutions would 
naturally vary in their forms. 'rUri Andropov, quoting Lenin, 
raised this aspect of the problem:
"All nations will arrive at socialism - this 
is inevitable - but they will not all arrive 
at it in the same way; each will make its own 
unique contribution in the shape of a certain 
form of democracy, a particular variety of the
dictatorship of the proletariat , or a different 
pace in the socialist transformation of different 
aspects of social life".55
Instead of insisting on a role for the Communist parties,
frequent reference was made to the examples of the Soviet
Central Asian Republics and to Mongolia, where the Socialist
revolution took place "even without the direct guidance of
56
the working class". Here, too, one finds reservations.
Zhukov, for example, pointed out that "they relate to the
parts of the SU which were under the influence of the
Russian proletariat... this example is therefore less typical
57
and can hardly be referred to...".
It was no longer the fashion to intermingle the 
non-capitalist path with ‘scientific socialism'. Nor was 
the notion patronized that revolutionary movements would 
automatically grow into socialism. Support for the liberation 
movements was consistently reiterated, but within the frame­
work of an international class struggle. It was held that 
the non-capitalist way would 'entail a change in the class 
struggle of society'. Therefore, it was only 'a means' for
creating socio-political conditions which would "pave the
58-
way for the transformation to socialism”.
As for the growth of the state sector, it was not 
equal to 'scientific construction'. Rather, it meant "on 
the one hand, the limitation of the positions of the national 
bourgeoisie, and on the other, the strengthening of the
64
positions of the working class". Simoniya defined the 
non-capitalist path of development sombrely: "That specific 
type of transition to socialism in which the stages of 
democratic transformation in previously backward countries, 
is accomplished under the leadership of revolutionary demo­
cracy, whose radical section, concurrently with these 
transformations, gradually goes over to the position of
00
scientific socialism". This re-orientation can be
61
summarized in the words of Nil'olayev:
"the non-capitalist path of development is the 
shortest way of building a modern independent 
economy. But it is not identical with outright 
construction of socialism...(I )t is premature 
to regard the countries developing non-capitalist 
way, as already being at the stage of socialist 
construction".
The re-assessment was coupled with a re-appraisal
of the general status of the national liberation movements.
By 1964, it was not regarded as a socialist path, ipso f a c t o ,
but as a lower stage of development. National liberation
wars were held to be an 'organic1 and 'integral' part of
the development of world revolution, but in the three
streams of the world revolutionary process - the national
liberation movement, the international Communist and
worker's movement, and the socialist commonwealth - the
62
first one was 'an ally' of the later two. Simoniya held 
that "to say their tasks (national liberation warsO merge 
with the tasks of socialist revolutions, and to suppose the 
decisive internal factor of leadership of workers, is to
59
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exaggerate the significance of the external factor”.
The leading, rather decisive, role was reserved essentially
for the Soviet Union , as the assistance given by the USSR
64
had "become a most important international factor".
Brezhnev, in his Central Committee Report to the 23rd Party
Congress, concluded his section devoted to the developing
areas, by saying that "the successes of the national liberation
movement are inseparably bound with the success of world
65
socialism and the international working class".
It was held that because of the experience the
Soviet Union had had, and its deterrent power against
imperialist ploys to undermine the revolutionary movements,
the USSR had a 'paralysing effect'. And that the national
liberation movements were gaining their strength because
of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev went a step further and
declared that the developing countries "are fully aware
that the policy of the USSR, and even the very existence of
the Socialist power, is an important factor contributing to
6 6
protect their independence".
This line of thinking was further elaborated by 
invoking another doctrinal tenet, that is, building the 
socialist countries up so that they could guard the inter­
national interests of the working class. Throughout 1965-66, 
the press and the ideologues continually referred to this
'primary' international duty of building socialism in the
67
Soviet Union. In the presence of a stronger Soviet Union,
65
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it would be "much easier to march along the (non-capitalist)
68
road". It was stressed that the additional opportunities
to extend all-round external economic ties were created by
the USSR's steady growth. Brezhnev observed that "the most
valuable contribution of the peoples of the Socialist countries
to the common revolutionary cause was the development and
69
strengthening of the world socialist system. In other words, 
the best way to support the national liberation struggles was 
to build the Soviet State.
The fate of most of the countries which had adopted 
the non-capitalist path in the 1960s, had clearly resulted 
in disillusionment. Though still insisting on the virtues 
of the non-capitalist way, the Soviets from the mid-1960s, 
displayed great flexibility in dealing with regimes of all 
complexions. While Soviet policy in Afro-Asia remained important 
the Brezhnev era de-emphasised the importance of spectacular 
short-run gains in the Developing Countries. It was hoped 
that in the 'multi-cultural states', even the capitalist 
way of development, and the imperialist finances in form 
of aid or investment, could play an 'objectively progressive' 
role. The non-capitalist path of development was, thus, 
redefined.
Though still as vocal and revolutionary in appearance 
as it was earlier, the Brezhnev leadership avoided, like its 
predecessors, defining the extent of its support to national 
liberation wars. The dysfunction of earlier optimisms eventually
67
resulted in readiness to come to terms with all sorts of 
regimes, and in abandoning Lenin's thesis that the revolu­
tions could occur in the 'weakest link' of the world-wide 
chain of imperialism. In the words of Kolakowski:
"...even the rhetoric of Soviet ideology has 
considerably changed since Stalin's time. It 
is now a vague, incoherent, pot-pourri of phra­
ses, mixing old communist tenets with ill- 
concealed nationalist slogans... ideology is 
not an independent variable shaping their 
decisions, even if these decisions are justi­
fied and presented in ideological terms".
It was with this framework of ideological re-appraisal 
for the Third World that the post-1964 Soviet leadership for­
mulated its strategy for the countries of the Persian Gulf 
region in general and Iraq in particular. Though the ruling 
Ba'th Party was considered by Moscow as a "bourgeois 
democratic movement" reflecting the interests of the non­
proletarian working masses, nevertheless, Soviet analysts 
have asserted that one of the principal achievements, of 
the 1958 revolution in Iraq was the establishment of "relations 
of friendship and cooperation" between the USSR and Iraq. 
Moreover, in retrospect, they have also asserted that
relations between the two states reached "a higher plane"
71
following the Ba'thist coup in 1968.
Moscow's keenness for friendlier relations with 
a progressive regime can be seen from that when Colonel 
Abdel-Salam Aref, who had persecuted the communists rather 
liberally, nationalized all private and foreign banks,
68
insurance companies and thirty industrial and commercial
concerns in July 1964, it was commented that the "progressive
character of the measures undertaken by the Iraqi government
is obvious. They can serve as a basis for further reforms
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in other areas of the Iraqi economy". These measures not
only prompted Soviet support for Iraqi government's handling
of the Kurdish problem, but also Soviet military and economic
aid. It was further declared that Iraq was pulling closer
to those countries which "have decisively chosen the path
73
of social renovation and progress".
When in July 1968 the Ba'thists returned to power, 
M i r s k y , a Soviet commentator, held that despite "whatever 
distortions and zigzags" the Iraqi revolution has undergone 
since 1958, the Ba'thist seizure of power" does not alter 
the historical significance of Iraq's anti-feudal anti­
imperialist revolution". He also cautioned that "an anti­
imperialist foreign policy can win the new government mass
74 .
support". Once in power, the Ba'th regime attempted to
widen the 'social base' through cooperating with the
communists. Without legalizing the Communist Party, hundreds
of communists were released from jails and a communist was
given a ministerial portfolio. This, coupled with anti-
¿X \„> c* t' o
imperialist Iraqi campaign was nespoft-ded by Moscow by increas­
ing economic and military assistance. Thus, Primakov observed 
in Pravda (18 September 1969) that the Ba'th Party is
* 7 5
"undergoing a definite ideological evolution". Coinciding 
with the March 1970 agreement with the Kurds was the Soviet
69
comment that "now the most important national problem was
the creation of a unified national democratic front of all
76
progressive forces". Besides, Moscow also showed its 
satisfaction and support on progressive legislation in the 
field of'agrarian reforms, social security, worker's pensions 
and the new labour laws. Thus, the Ba'thist Iraq was, in 
Moscow's view, a progressive state marching along the 
non-capitalist path of development. Moscow, therefore, had 
no hesitation in accepting bourgeois nationalist leaders 
leading -#©* national liberation movement in Iraq as Aleksey 
Kosygin (Chairman of the USSR Council of Minslters and 
CPSU Politburo member) stated in February 1972, two months 
before signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation:
The development of all-round cooperation with 
(Iraq) is not determined by any circumstantial 
considerations but stems from the general trend 
of the Soviet foreign policy, from the peace 
program that was set out in the decisions of 
the 24th CPSU Congress...we are convinced that 
our foreign policy programme...(is) aimed at 
consolidation of peace in support of the just 
struggle of the peoples for national liberation, 
is in keeping a 
Iraqi people".*
so with the interests of the
C H A P T E R - 3
FORMATION OF A UNITED FRONT
The most important task confronting the Ba'th 
government during the period under our study was the establish­
ment of a 'united front'. On this, Moscow held, depended imple­
mentation of the Charter for National Action. This charter was a 
'progressive' programme for the socio-economic transformation of 
the Iraqi society by undertaking agrarian reforms and strengthen­
ing of the state sector. All this depended on the degree of 
cooperation between the Ba'th Party, Iraqi Community Party (ICP) 
and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) on the one hand, and on 
their relationships with Moscow on the other. These are, thus, 
discussed in this chapter in order to highlight the evolving 
Soviet view of Iraq's travel along the non-capitalist path of 
development and to trace the delicate balance Moscow tried to 
maintain with these parties.
The "progressive wing" of Iraq's Arab Ba'th Party 
came to power on July 17, 1968, with which "a qualitatively new 
period in Iraqi history" began.'*’ The Ba'th takew over ended,
Soviet observers maintained, "the military dictatorial methods 
of government which had in large measure distorted the anti­
imperialist and democratic aims of July 1958 Revolution".
Soviet media described the Ba'th Party as a "bourgeois- 
democratic movement", its progressive nucleus reflecting what 
they characterised as "the interests of the non-proletarian
70
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working masses made up of the peasantry and the petit bourgeoisie". 
The Ba'th Party, it was asserted, reflected the attitudes of the 
peasantry more than that of the urban proletariat. Therefore, it 
was held, the Ba'th Party reflected such "popular feelings" as 
"nationalism, anti-imperialism and to a certain extent, the 
religious beliefs of the mass of the population".
Soviet analysts pointed out that between 1963 and 1968, 
there was a radical transformation particularly in the leader­
ship of the Ba'th Party. The party, it was reported, eliminated 
extremism from its ranks and "disassociated itself from the 
mistakes and excesses of the previous leadership" - committed 
at the time of "the tragic events" of February and March 1963,
"which cost the lives of the thousands of communists and democrats
2
in Iraq". It was further observed that "(at that time) manifesta­
tions of anti-communism, the terror against progressive forces, 
and the attempts to monopolize power served as the main reason
3
for its defeat". As against this, the Ba'th of the post 1968 
period was described as having tried to formulate a platform 
which would be compatible with the interests of most Iraqis.
In doing so, Moscow felt that new "revolutionary movement" 
served "to restore and reinvigorate" Iraq's "anti-imperialist
4
and progressive policies".
The most important task confronting the new Iraqi 
government was the creation of a "National Front", unifying 
"all progressive anti-imperialist organisations" including the
5
KDP and the ICP. In December 1971, however, Soviet comment
'.Cr-'V-
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charged that a struggle was occurdng within the Ba'th Party 
between what was described as "anti-imperialist progressive 
forces wholeheartedly devoted to the ideals of freedom and 
social progress and the elements bound by material and other 
ties to the moribund social relationships and to the foreign oil 
monopolies operating in the country"
Soviet writers had earlier observed that "leftovers 
of anti-communism, and mistrust for the Iraqi communists, are still
7
manifested in the ruling party". This was said to have been the 
case particularly within the military. In early April 1970, 
reference was made to talk by "some people", concerning the
g
exclusion of the ICP from the proposed National Front. Similarly, 
in early 1971, the Soviet media carried reports of Communist 
activists' persecution in a Baghdad jail and the frequency of 
arrests of communists. Moscow noted that these actions testified 
"to fact that the reactionary forces in Iraq have not laid down 
their arms" but were still attempting to sabotage the unifica-
9
tion of anti-imperialist elements in Iraq.
It was maintained by the commentators that it would 
be unrealistic to attempt to isolate the influential ICP. They 
claimed that the accession of the Ba'th Party to power would 
have been impossible without the ICP's "selfless struggle 
against imperialism and internal reaction".1^ Thus, it was held 
that any attempt aimed at isolating the Iraqi Communists would 
ignore "alignment of forces" in Iraq and this would not contri­
bute to Iraq's progressive development.11 By July 1971, however, 
Moscow noted that the Ba'thists had taken the position of the
ICP into account as the former attempted to unify the 
"patriotic forces" in Iraq. Thus the Iraqi government, it 
was reported, issued a decree calling for the release of Iraqi 
Communists and other "so-called democrats" from Iraqi prisons.
For their part, the Iraqi Communists were described as attempt­
ing "to eliminate old antagonisms and cultivate understanding
12and cooperation" between revolutionary groups.
Prior to March 1970 the Soviets had contended that
the persistence of the Kurdish problem presented a very serious
impediment to the establishment of a national front composed
13
of all progressive elements within Iraqi society. They claimed
that the establishment of such a front would be unrealistic
without the participation of K D P . Thus, the agreement of 11 March
1970 (to be discussed in detail in chapter four) , between the
Iraqi government and the KDP was characterised as providing
"an opportunity to regain the unity of the democratic and pro-
14
gressive forces" of which the KDP was an integral part. Follow­
ing the agreement, Soviet writers repeatedly claimed that a 
certain amount of cooperation and trust was established between 
the KDP and Ba'th Party leadership. Four months later, in July 
1970, the KDP in its Congress was said to have appealed for
the establishment of a 'national democratic front' which would
15
coalesce all of Iraq's anti-imperialist parties.
The Draft Charter of National Action (DCNA) of the 
Ba'th Party was published in November 1970. Soviet observers 
intepreted this event as opening "a new stage on the road to 
amalgamation of the country's patriotic forces". This initiative
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by the Ba'th Party was supposedly viewed as a "positive move11 
by many elements of the Iraqi political spectrum. It was said 
to have provided a plan for Iraq's progressive national develop­
ment and therefore would constitute the basis for the unifica-
17
tion of progressive, anti-imperialist elements of Iraq. * In 
the arena of domestic politics, the Draft Charter reportedly 
called for cooperation among the various forces in the country 
and the establishment of "a national coalition", thereby serving 
to broaden the base of the Iraqi government. The programme also 
provided for the election of a National Assembly and the promul­
gation of a new constitution which would embody such provisions 
as guarantees for democratic freedom, particularly freedom of
political expression for these parties "sharing the aims
18enunciated by the Charter".
The significance of the Draft Charter was thoroughly 
analysed. One commentator pointed out that its publication showed 
that the progressive wing of the Ba'th Party "now had an input 
into policy formulation". It was also maintained that the crea­
tion of a National Front in Iraq would facilitate Iraqls develop­
ment in several ways. Among other things, the Draft Charter would
contribute to Iraq's socio-economic and cultural development along
19
progressive lines as well as strengthen Iraq's independence.
One writer asserted that "if the efforts of the leading Iraqi 
political organizations to establish a National Democratic Front 
are constructive, if the progressive social circles display a 
proper sense of responsibility, and if no attempts are made to 
upset the natural balance of forces in this front, then unity
and cooperation may indeed become a reality". However, the 
same commentator warned, "any attempt to dictate or to discrimi­
nate against one or another organization" or "advance demands 
ignoring the true state of affairs" in the country would 
"serve only to retard the formation of the National Democratic 
Front".20
Throughout 1972 and partially into 1973, a number of 
steps were reportedly taken to establish the National Front. In 
December 1971, the First Secretary of the ICP, Aziz Mohammad, 
was cited as having expressed his Party's support for the 
project. In response to a question concerning leadership of 
the proposed front "at the present stage", he stated:
"As far as Communists are concerned we are 
convinced that the Ba'th Party, being the ruling 
party, is capable of exercising real state power.
In the present conditions it is this party which 
governs the country. We only ask for cooperation 
on the basis of mutual respect and agreement or 
a common programme, with preservation of our 
organizational and ideological independence and 
our lawful right to function as a political 
party".21
In order to promote cooperation between the progressive
forces, the ICP even expressed its willingness to postpone the
solution of existing problems until after the national front
22was established. Reflecting the spirit of cooperation, which
Moscow claimed was developing in May 1972, the government was
reorganized and two portfolios were allocated to members of 
23the ICP. This governmental reorganisation was judged to be
24
in the spirit of the National Charter.
7b
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Assessing progress in June 1972, however, Soviet 
commentators adopted a somewhat less optimistic view of develop­
ments. Seemingly criticising the K D P , one observer maintained 
that two years had passed since the agreement of March 197CT 
between the Kurds and the Iraqi government and the proposed 
National Front had remained stalled on the talking stage.
Noting this, Soviet writers ,like the ICP, appealed the parties 
to "raise above the narrow party interests" as the specific
interests "could be raised after the proposed National Front
25
had been formed".
One gets the impression from the Soviet media that
Moscow held the KDP responsible for retarding the creation
of the National Front. In contrast to the commentary concerning
the position of the ICP, the attitude of the KDP was discussed
in rather general terms and even there in conjunction with the
26
position of the Ba'th Party and the ICP.
It was, however, noted that discussions were held
between representatives of the ICP and the KDP in June 1973
concerning the establishment of a National Front and on July 13,
1973 it was stated that all indications pointed to the conclusion
27
that Iraq would shortly adopt a charter for the National Front.
On July 17, 1973 the Soviet media carried reports that the Ba'th
Party and the ICP had reached an agreement concerning the
Charter and principally on the establishment of 'ttie Progressive
National Patriotic Front' (PNPF). The agreement was heralded
as a "historic act" and a "turning point'1 in the relations between
28the two parties. Furthermore, progressive elements throughout
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the world were said to have viewed the Front's establishment 
as an important event for Iraq and for whole of the Arab national 
liberation movement. K. Geyvandov, one commentator, for example 
wrote in Pravda, "a great gain of the Iraqi revolution was the 
creation of the Progressive National Patriotic Front within 
whose framework the Ba'th Party, the Iraqi Communist Party, and
29
other of country's national and democratic forces are operating". 
Evaluating the significance of the agreement, another analyst 
asserted that it provided a foundation for coalition of all 
of Iraq's progressive elements. The decisive factor in complet­
ing the National Front was indeed participation of the K D P , 
it was added. Thus, both the Ba'th and the ICP urged the KDP
to participate in the Front and emphasised that they would
30
continue discussions with the KDP towards that end.
In late April 1974, Soviet commentators described the 
structure and composition of the PNPF as follow:
"The Iraq's progressive front currently comprise 
the ruling Ba'th Party, the ICP, the Independent 
Democrats and the Progressive Nationalists. The 
Front is guided in its activities by the National 
Action Charter...The parties which comprise the 
front retain their own political, ideological and 
organizational independence".31
Following the agreement, however, relations between 
the Iraqi Communists and the KDP were said to have deteriorated. 
In January 1974 Soviet observers spoke of accusations having 
been exchanged between the ICP and the KDP and the publication 
of"controversial" articles in the ICP and the KDP organs.
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Eventually, representatives of the two parties initiated talks
in November 1973 to resolve the abnormal situation among them.
As a result of these negotiations, an agreement was reached
to terminate the campaign of charges and counter-charges. Indeed,
the organ of the ICP reportedly held that the agreement could
serve as the foundation for future cooperation between the two
parties. The K D P , reportedly, also called for self-control on
the part of the Kurdish resistance in order to prevent confront-
32
ation with the ICP and the Iraqi Army. Here one finds emerging 
neutrality on part of the Soviet commentators in regard to the 
ICP and the KDP rift as one such commentiry of Janauary 1974 
had stated:
•'One need not go into who is to blame. It appears 
that the interests of the two parties and the count­
ry's demand that accusations and counter-accusations 
should be abandoned and that the fraternal relations 
which existed previously... should be restored, for 
these two parties (KDP, ICP) fought resolutely side 
by side throughout the years of the national libera­
tion struggle..."33
Despite the agreement, however, Soviet observers noted 
that the situation in Kurdistan continued to deteriorate. Simul­
taneously, relations between the ICP & the KDP also worsened. 
Still, a somewhat positive attitude was reflected in commentaries. 
In April 1974, for example, Radio Moscow announced that the
organ of the KDP ha^ stated that it was about to join the
34
national front. Such positive reporting notwithstanding, it 
was, however, finally admitted in the Spring of 1974 that the 
KDP ha*j* rejected the offer of participation in the PNPF in 
conjunction with the latter's rejection of the 11 March 1974 law.
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Throughout the remainder of 1974 and well into 1975, Moscow 
increasingly charged that the reactionary elements of the KDP 
ha\|4 come to dominate the Party and, consequently, attempts 
were made to induce 'patriotically-inclined' Kurdish political 
organizations to join the PNPP.
Reflecting the "spirit of cooperation" on the part 
of progressive w^ing of the K D P , it was held in March 1975 that 
leaders of the National Front and the Democratic Party of Kurdis­
tan participated in celebrations commemorating the fifth signing
35
of the March Manifesto. Though generally frustrated by the 
KDP, a renewed emphasis was placed on "further strengthening" 
of the National Front, as was manifested by Saddam Hussain's 
address to the Plenary Meeting of the Progressive National
30
Patriotic Front of Iraq, and on the occasion of the Third
37
Anniversary of the Soviet-Iraqi Friendship Treaty.
Soviet analysts had maintained, as has already been
noted, that the establishment of a National Front would provide
greater internal stability and allow the government in Iraq to
concentrate on dealing with the socio-economic problems. The
Charter of National Action had hoped to provide Iraq with an
opportunity to establish 'a socialist society'. The Charter had
specifically rejected capitalism, describing it as unsuitable
38
for Iraq's needs. Thus with socialism as goal, Iraq was said 
to have achieved great success in socio-economic development, 
even if the KDP had not joined the National Front
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“Soviet people react with kindest feelings to 
what the Iraqi people have achieved. The national­
ization of the oil companies, the implementation 
of the agrarian reform law, the measures to raise 
the popular masscj’living conditions, the peaceful 
solution of the Kurdish problem, and the streng­
thening of the front of progressive forces... all 
these are important steps in the country's 
development".39
In July 1975, the Iraqi ambassador to Moscow was
reported to have said that "Iraq is marching along the path of
40
socialist construction". Moscow continued to herald Iraq's
"important role" in the "Arab National Liberation Movement,"
41
and in the "struggle against imperialism". Throughout 1975,
Moscow increasingly accused the West of constantly conspiring
41
against the Ba'thist Iraq. It, however, never acknowledged
KDP's refusal to join the National Front and continued to
herald Iraq's "important role" in the "Arab national liberation
42
movement1.' and its "struggle against imperialism".
Moscow's insistance on the establishment of an anti­
imperialist united front - even if not headed by the Communists 
was indeed in line with its ideological formulations. As we have 
noted, the USSR favoured a maximum amount of cooperation based 
on minimum items. This is probably why the USSR went to great 
lengths to back the March 1970 agreement. It also helped by Spon­
soring agreements between the ICP and the Ba'th, the ICP and 
the K D P , and, the KDP and the Ba'th Party. Moscow made it 
obvious that it wanted KDP to participate in the National 
Front.
81
If a compromise could have been reached on K D P 1s 
participation in the National Front (and, of course, on the 
issue of autonomy for Kurdistan , which we have discussed in 
chapter four), then the USSR could have used two of the three 
partners in the Iraqi government (the ICP and the KDP) to 
counter-balance the third (the Ba'th). Moreover, Moscow could 
have played, if necessary and at least to some extent, the .KDP 
off against the ICP. Clearly, the USSR would have preferred to 
have had two levers (the ICP and the KDP) to counter-balance 
the ruling Ba'th Party. This, of course, implied that hostili­
ties between the KDP and the Ba'thists, to say nothing of the 
KDP and the ICP, be avoided and these parties be incorporated 
into the United Front. As against these propositions, Moscow, 
in reality could not always take any of these parties for 
granted.
In this chapter we have also noted that Moscow never 
really had any effective control over the situation in Iraq, 
consequently, the possibility of using the KDP in future became 
increasingly unrealistic. Furthermore, as it became obvious 
that Moscow would have to take sides, it chose Baghdad.
The USSR had several incentives in supporting Baghdad. 
First, the Ba'th Party was in power and thus it was far more 
important than the opposition parties which had little chance 
of coming to power on their own. Second, the Ba'thists themselves 
were eagerly seeking friendly ties with the USSR, especially in 
the wake of 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Moscow, on its part,
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having lost Egypt to the West, probably stood equally in need 
of a friendly state in the Arab World. Third, the Ba'thists 
were no longer persecuting the Iraqi Communists. Instead, with 
Moscow's encouragement, the ICP was admitted as junior partner 
of the government. This indeed was an ideal position from 
Moscow's standpoint of a national democratic state. Moreover, 
the Ba'th government had chosen to travel along the non-Capitalist 
path of development, as Moscow called it, by initiating agrarian 
reforms and strengthening the state sector internally and joining 
the 'anti-imperialist' forces - headed by the USSR - internation­
ally. It had given Moscow a degree of leverage over the Ba'thists 
and, indeed, a degree of ideological legitimacy to cultivate a 
national democratic Arab State.
The K D P , because of its attitude towards Baghdad, had 
become a political liability in Soviet dealings with Iraq. Moscow, 
consequently decided to abandon the KDP in favour of the Ba'thists 
and their partners, the ICP. Had the USSR overtly supported the 
KDP over Baghdad, Moscow would have run the risk of driving 
Baghdad to the West. Moreover, had Moscow supported the KDP 
irrespective of the ICP's own reaction, the general position 
of the ICP could well have also worsened, or Moscow's influence 
over it considerably diminished, and the ICP would have become 
more independent or faced a split.
It is, however, important to note that in abandoning 
the KDP, the USSR did not cut off all ties altogether. As we 
have seen, a desire to maintain links was reflected in the
_  -v» . - riir**Wfir r,rm <» »M K»" I M»I I ..
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positive treatment accorded to the so-called progressive wing 
of the KDP. In the next chapter, we shall see that Moscow
went to great lengths to avoid the impression of discarding the 
Kurdish movement as it discarded the Kurdish leadership. Though 
the solution of the Kurdish question was intrinsically related 
to the establishment of the United F r o n t , but treating it 
seperately would enable us to see the Soviet attitude towards 
an autonomy/sepèration seeking nationality.
C H A P T E R - 4
The Ku r d s , residing in the mountainous area of northern 
Iraq, constitute over 20 percent of the Iraqi population. During 
1961-66, the Kurdish areas were described as zones of continuous 
fighting. On June 29, 1966, a ceasefire was arranged, under the 
terms of a twelve-point programme designed to secure the peace­
ful resolution of the Kurdish question. The programme was said 
to have recognized Kurdish national rights within a 'united 
Iraqi homeland'. Despite this, tensions persisted in northern 
Iraq and, while regular clashes had for the most part ceased, 
occasional incidents continued. Each side reportedly blamed 
the other for the continued problems. Soviet observers noted 
that, on the one hand, "Kurdish leaders accused Baghdad of 
failing to carry out the 1966 agreements and seeking to impose 
a 'military solution1." Baghdad, on the other hand, "reproached 
the Kurds with intransigence" and "bellicosity". In other words, 
according to Moscow, "mutual mistrust was still very strong".1
The new Ba'th government having ccme to power in July 
1968,was greeted with praise for its policy of seeking a peace­
ful solution to the Kurdish problem. The new government "realized 
that the popular masses" attitude towards the regime, the future 
of the Iraqi revolution and the country's unity in the face of 
Imperialist and Zionist aggression in the Near East , all
THE KU RD I SH  QUESTION
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depends to a great extent on the resolution of the Kurdish 
question".2
The KDP was characterised as one of Iraq's largest 
political parties - a party which cemented the cooperation of
.4
the Arabs and Kurds. Moreover, just as the Ba'th Party would 
not have come to power without the efforts of the ICP, similarly, 
the Soviets argued that the Ba'thist accession could not have 
been possible without what was described as "the Kurdish 
democrats" struggle for self-assertion of the Kurdish people 
as a constituent part of a united Iraq with the same rights as
3
tlje Arabs"
On September 21, 1968, the new government introduced 
a new provisional constitution which provided for "equal rights 
for Kurds and Arabs within the framework of the Iraqi State".
On January 25, 1970, the Ba'th re-affirmed the June 1966 pro­
gramme and announced a general amnesty for all those involved 
in "the northern events". Those involved were no longer 
obligated to surrender their arms and ammunition. Furthermore, 
anyone who had been dismissed from his job as a result of the 
hostilities was to be re-instated. In the late 1970 and continu­
ing into early 1971, what was described as a "dialogue", took 
place between representatives of the Iraqi government and 
Kurdish leaders. Thus, in the words of one Soviet commentator, 
"healthy elements have reached this stage from both sides 
with a full awareness of the need for constructive steps to
4
solve the Kurdish problem".
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On March 11, 1970, the "prolonged fratricidal war 
between the Arabs and the Kurds which took thousands of lives 
and cost over 1.5 billion dollars" was reported to have formally
5ended. Further describing the provisions of the March 1970 
agreement ending hostilities, Moscow observed:
"The agreement envisages the introduction of 
amendments to Iraq's provisional constitution 
to the effect that the Iraqi people comprise 
two main nationalities - Arabs and Kurds. The 
constitution confirms the national rights of 
the Kurds and the other minorities within the 
framework of Iraqi uni-y (the Kurds make up 19 
percent of the Iraqi population). The Kurdish 
language is declared official alongwith the 
Arab language. One of the country's Vice- 
Presidents must be a Kurd. The Kurds will parti­
cipate directly in the legislative and executive 
organs of the central and local powers . Great 
attention is devoted in the agreement to the 
problems of culture and education as a whole.
In Sulaymaniyah, for example, a Kurd Univer­
sity has been created and a Kurd faculty opened 
in the philosophical instructure; education in 
Kurdish regions will be carried out in the 
native language. Some of the proposals in the 
agreement are calculated to ease the people's 
life. These include points renting to the 
payment of money grants to the families of 
Kurds who have fallen on the battle-field, the 
return of Kurds and Arabs to this native lands, 
special measures to eliminate unemployment and 
many others. After a consensus is held, it is 
intended to make alterations in the administra­
tive divisions in the north, taking into account 
the prevalence of the Kurd population in different 
regions. There is already an arrangement on the 
creation of a special Kurd province. Without 
infringing on Kurd's national dignity, a solution 
is also being sought for such a complex question 
as the future position of the Kurdish armed 
forces. Thus, irregular detachments of 
("Peshmerga") Kurdish patriots will remain 
as a national guard".6
The agreement was judged to be "a measure of signi­
ficance not only for the democratic situation in Iraq, but for 
Iraq's international position and world's progressive forces
7generally". The agreement was said to have accomplished several 
things. It reportedly established the pre-requisites for con­
solidating Iraq's progressive forces and for normalizing the 
internal situation in Iraq. In this way, major studies were 
said to have been undertaken to foil the West' s alleged policy of 
capitalizing on the Kurdish-Arab hostilities to divide and 
grule Iraq. The agreement was also interpreted as recognizing 
Kurdish "national dignity" within the framework of the Iraqi 
9State. Furthermore, it was said to have opened the way for 
institutionalisation of a spirit of cooperation between Iraq's 
two principal nationalities: the Arabs and the Kurds.10 Finally, 
the agreement opened the way for not only promotion of a United 
National Front but also for reallocating resources to socio­
economic and cultural projects. 1
As Iraq's ability to resist "western encroachments"
increased and as it accelerated its "progressive policies", the
position of the entire national liberation movement of Asia and
Africa, of which Iraq was said to be an important part, would
12be strengthened. Prior to the agreement, Soviet analysts
held, the Kurdish problem prevented Iraq from "playing the role
13it should have in the general Arab cause". In the words of 
one writer, the agreement of 11th March was "a symbol of the 
fact that a serious start has been made toward ending the mutual
87
prejudice that has burst up over many years". Two other
writers, however, observed that "the important positive result
achieved by the settlement with the Kurds in Iraq is not a
15resolution to the entire problem". Thus, it was asserted 
that "as the experience of many countries show, a successful 
national policy is a difficult matter demanding painstaking
1daily work, which is virtually only just starting in Iraq".
Shortly after the conclusion of the agreement, one
could see, it was reported, the "positive impact" which the
termination of hostilities had upon life in Northern Iraq.
The state of emergency was over and the plans had reportedly been
formulated for socio-economic developmental projects in the
17north. Citing some of the gains, one commentator observed:
"Trade ties had been restored between the north 
and the other regions of the country. Produce 
from Kurd small holdings and stubble fields was 
being marketed in the Arab regions, consumer 
goods were being received from Baghdad without 
hindrance- . Brigades of Kurd and Arab road- 
building workers were renewing the highways 
and houses which had been destroyed were being 
restored".18
Politically the KDP was legalised and branches of 
the party were opened in the principal cities including the 
capital. The party also began circulating its newspaper. Five 
Kurds, including three KDP Executive Committee members, reportedly 
joined the government. In additon, Kurds were also said to have 
been appointed governors of four of IraqVs northern provinces. 
Moscow stated that the Iraqi government had decided to provide 
a monthly compensation to members of the 'Peshmerga1 until
88
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they could find employment. Thus, by March 1971, Soviet 
commentators held that a measure of cooperation and trust had 
been established between KDP and the Ba'thists. However, it 
was also pointed out that the Arab-Kurd conflict Mhas left many
20unremoved traces, much bitterness, and many reciprocal claims".
It was, therefore, highlighted that "under these conditions
extremist sentiments...which are supported by some figures
lacking sufficient self-control and maturity, could do Iraq 
21a disservice" upon life in northern Iraq.
Soviet observers, however,, reported from the very 
outset that the agreement produced alarm in Israel and the 
West. Less than one month after the conclusion of the agreement, 
it thus warned that "foreign agents as well as local reactiona­
ries were accelerating their efforts" to sow discord to sabotage
22the reconciliatory efforts. These initial warnings continued 
to get more and more coverage in the Soviet media. In late 1971, 
it was reported that "pro-imperialist reactionary elements" 
made an attempt on the life of Mustapha Al-Barzani, the Kurdish 
leader. Accompanying the attempt allegedly were predictions in 
the western media that Arab-Kurdish relations were about to
/■\collapse, and that their agreement was only a "scarp of paper". 
This theme was said to have been complemented by efforts of 
"certain foreign radio systems" to "inflame passions" by 
asserting that the trust which had emerged "has now collapsed 
and that matters are moving, if not towards a resumption of
the internecine war, at least toward a break in relations".
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Throughout 1972, Soviet writers continued to focus
attention on what they characterized as the "distorting role
played by the forces of imperialism in the past events in
24Iraq". For example, in August 1972, Western media were cited
as having published increasingly prejudiced reports on "the
occurrences of complications in the relations between the
25Ba'thist command and the Kurds". The objective of these, 
reportedly, was to exacerbate tensions between the Kurds andT 
the Arabs and thereby stimulate a new round of hostilities. The 
choice of words here is significant since Moscow was apparently 
admitting that there were "occurrences of complications" and 
that the West merely reported these "complications" with 
increased prejudice. Additional implicit acknowledgement that 
all was not progressing smoothly in northern Iraq came in 
March, 1973. At that time, commenting on discussions held with 
certain Arab and Kurds, a Soviet writer observed in Pravda that 
"some talked about going slow in implementing some of the 
articles of agreement". It was further stated by the same 
commentator, "I felt that there was a trend to blame the other 
side yet none of those who talked to me objected to the agreement 
At any rate, Soviet analysts stressed that the West was continu­
ing its policy of exacerbating Kurdish-Arab tensions. They indeed 
claimed that these provocations intensified whenever conditions 
for the establishment of a national front improved. The attempt 
on Barzani's life was cited as an example of this. However,
it was noted that both Ba'th and KDP leaders "displayed enough
27wisdom to prevent developments from taking a dangeroui^ turn".
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In April 1970, Soviet writers had linked "the 
persistent struggle which the Iraqi Communists have waged for 
a most rapid democratic settlement in the north" with the 
"success in solving the Kurdish problem". It was stated:
"The principle of the Kurds' national autonomy, 
the complete recognition of their rights within 
the framework of the Iraqi state, and the defence 
of their national interests.... all these slogans 
and demands have been submitted at one time or 
another by the ICP as platforms for the solution 
of the Kurdish problem and have been set down in 
a number of Iraqi Communist Party d o c u m e n t s " . 28
The July 1973 agreement between the ICP and the 
Ba'th Party was heralded in the Soviet media as a step which 
would contribute to the solution of what was still referred to 
as the "Kurdish problem". While noting that the KDP had been 
invited to participate in the newly formed coalition, Moscow 
acknowledged by the end of 1973 that there remained obstacles 
to KDP participation. The existence of these obstacles was, 
of course, attributed to the activities of "Western agents 
and local reactionaries".2^
It was, however, admitted by January 1974, that 
relations between the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Iraqi 
Communist Party had deteriorated. It was reported that the ICP 
Politburo had sent a memorandum to the KDP accusing armed KDP 
groups of pursuing ICP members. The KDP, in turn was said to 
have accused the ICP of paying insufficient attention to the 
Kurdish question. Moreover, the ICP was accused of not sympathising 
with the Kurdish aspirations. Moscow noted that, despite denials 
by both sides, "the charges should not be dismissed lightly",
since deterioration of relations between the two parties would
only benefit the West and its conservative allies in the area.
Accompanying these reports, however, were encouraging reports
that the ICP and KDP had taken steps toward normalizing relations
31between their two parties. Moscow urged such a normalization 
and one gets the impression that to the Soviets such relations 
were still possible as was also the prospect of the establish­
ment of a national front.
On 11th March, 1974, four years after the 1970 agreement,
the Iraqi government proclaimed measures such as the "Autonomy
of the Kurdish area within the framework of the Iraqi Republic".
Discussing the new law, Soviet observers maintained that it
broadened the terms of the March agreement. Under this new law,
the Kurds could excercise self-government in a number of fields
and the Iraqi Kurdistan was supposedly to become "a separate
administrative unit". Kurdistan’s administrative bodies would
be composed of an elected legislative council and an executive
committee. The President would appoint the Chairman of the
latter from among the legislative council members. In addition,
the Kurds would be responsible for distribution of that part
of the Republic's budget allocated to Kurdistan. Finally,
Kurdish and Arabic would constitute the official languages
of Kurdistan. Assessing the significance of the new law, Moscow
felt it could potentially provide foundation for the establish-
32ment and close relations between the Kurds and the Arabs. The 
Iraqi government was said to have also passed a law which offered 
a "general amnesty" for all Kurdish military personnel as well
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civilians who were being held for previous violations of
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Immediately following the announcement of the new 
law, the Soviet media began to develop the theme that right wing 
elements which had "penetrated the KDP as a result of its class
Simultaneously, it was noted that differences persisted concerning 
some of the provisions of the March agreement. Differing, some­
times conflicting ,interpretations were reportedly being put 
forth concerning the exact boundaries of Kurdistan. Initially, 
Soviet writers adopted an optimistic line in their assessment 
of the seriousness of these differences. Eventually, however, 
they admitted that the negotiations had reached an impasse 
concerning the fate of the oil-rich Kirkuk area. Certain Kurdish 
leaders were said to have demanded that Kirkuk be included in 
the Kurdish area. Their demands were said to have been motivated 
by historical factors as well as their assertion that the majority 
of the area's inhabitants were Kurdish. However, Moscow hastened 
to add that due to the absence of recent census data, there was 
no definitive information available concerning the size of the 
population and its national composition. As a result, the Iraqi 
government reportedly called for the establishment of a joint
Kurdish-Arab administration in Kirkuk which would be subordinate
35to Baghdad. The Kurds, however, refused to accept the plan.
One commentator observed that negotiations could have resolved 
the question had not"unexpected incidents" intervened. The KDP 
leadership was said to have "suddenly" announced that it would
martial law. 33
heterogeneity" were attempting to "arouse separatist sentiments". 34
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not support the government's plan for Kurdish self-rule. The 
KDP members then ceased to participate in negotiations with 
the government; their newspaper halted publication. Some elements 
of Kurdish population set off for the mountains, where even 
after 1970, the main residence of the KDP continued to be situated
and where Kurdish armed detachments — the Peshmerga - had been
•  ^ 36 retained.
Throughout the renainder of 1974 and well into 1975 
(and rest of the 1970s, for that matter), Moscow increasingly 
charged the "reactionary elements of the KDP who had come to 
dominate the party" and consequently, attempts were made to 
induce as were called, "patriotically-inclined Kurdish political 
organizations". It was stated by a writer that the action of 
"the reactionary dominated KDP" combined with the renewed fight­
ing in Kurdistan "had forced a con^iderable number of Kurds, 
including certain members of the KDP leadership to break away 
from its leaders and renew the party advocating the strengthening 
of ties with the progressive forces" of the country and "support
for the socio-economic reforms" which were "being implemented and
37the law on autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan".
These developments were projected by the Soviet media 
with a claim that contradictions within the Kurdish Democratic 
party had surfaced and hence, a left and a right wing of the 
movement had appeared. The leftist elements of the KDP, of 
course, advocated close ties between Iraq's progressive elements 
and the initiation of progressive socio-economic reforms in 
Kurdistan similar to those already undertaken in other parts
of Iraq. Consequently, a group of prominent figures, including
a KDP Politburo member, Aziz Agrawi' , supported the law on 
38autonomy. However, right wing elements representing "the
feudal, tribal nobility" also became increasingly active and
opposed closer relations with Iraq's progressive parties. In
addition, these rightist elements were also reported to have opposed
the extension to Kurdistan of even progressive socio-economic
programmes such as agrarian reforms. It was denied that "these
feudal and bourgeois" elements of the right wing of the KDP
39constituted "most of the Kurdish leaders". The responsibility
for rejection of the new autonomy law, of course, rested "on
the shoulders of these forces that represent the right wing of
the Democratic Party of Kurdistan". These elements were also
said to have "been prejudiced against, and distrustful of, the
progressive steps taken by Baghdad from the beginning" and
40were "guided by unethical interests and ambitions".
It was charged by the Soviet media that the right
wing Kurd leaders had been affected by pressure from Western
agents and local reactionaries who had capitalized on "the
splittist mood" of the right wing of the KDP. Along these
lines, it was claimed, that.these external forces were providing
the Kurdish extremists with military equipment as well as finan-
41cial aid. On its part, the right wing of the KDP was described 
as having undertaken a series of measures: opening of the 
Iranian — Iraqi frontier, and declaring its willingness to 
accept support from any quarter, including Israel and the United 
States. It also offered to grant the Americans an oil concession
y5
at Kirkuk in return for the US aid. Along these lines, the
right wing elements, it was alleged, assured the West that
had they been able to, they would have prevented the nationali-
42zation of Western oil interests in Iraq.
Soviet observers claimed that the right wing of the
KDP constituted an ally of the West and Israel. By supporting
the Kurds, the West allegedly hoped to overthrow the Iraqi
government and thereby regain lost ground in the Gulf area.
The Western powers allegedly looked upon the Kurdish movement
as merely "an interim tool to achieve their own aims"; once
these aims were achieved, the West would "then doom this movement
43to oblivion and liquidate it". Therefore, in the words of
one analyst, "while posing as friends of the Kurdish people,
the West has sought only the elimination of Iraq's progressive
government. Indeed, only immature people or politicians who
do not hold the destinies of their people very dear can fail
44to understand this".
As tension mounted, clashes occurred, resulting in 
the Kurdish retreat deep into their mountain strongholds. While 
admitting that reports of the renewed hostilities gave "rise to 
anxiety", the Soviet media criticized the foreign press, includ­
ing the press in Turkey and Iran, for printing what was called 
"false data", "lies", and "discounted press exaggerations"
designed to "incite the reader" and thereby "increase the
45tense domestic situation" in Iraq. Moscow, however held 
that the Iraqi government was more accommodating in granting 
a 30 days' extension for Kurds to return to their place of
9fc>
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employment from the mountains as the original law had been 
set to expire on 25 April.
Beginning during the Summer of 1974, the USSR's 
image of events in Kurdistan however somewhat changed as the
media started giving emphasis to the political struggle over
Z*L
the military developments in Kurdistan. Writing in the Rubezhom 
on 2 August 1974, one analyst wrote:
"The ICP, just like the Ba'th Party, condemned 
these dissenting activities of the right wing 
of the KDP. The government was forced to begin 
military reprisals. Nevertheless, basic efforts 
are being directed at solving the Kurdish problem 
politically. Attempts are being made at attracting 
patriotically-inclined Kurdish political organiza­
tions to participate in the Progressive National 
Patriotic Front'.'46
While the media always discussed the efforts of the 
Iraqi government to continue the programme of autonomy for 
Kurdistan despite the fighting, from the Summer of 1974 onwards,
47almost exclusive attention was devoted to the political struggle.
It was finally claimed on 13 March 1974 that an agreement was
concluded which provided for the termination of hostilities
between units of the Iraqi army and Kurdish forces. This was
followed by the reports that the shooting had died down and
"thousands of Kurdish families who were on Iranian territory
48have expressed their wish to return to Iraq".
By the end of 1974, for example, it was stressed that 
peace had been restored throughout most of Kurdistan. The 
machinery of self-rule was said to be operating, the economy
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was stabilizing, and trade links had been restored between
49northern and southern Iraq. While occasional reports did
appear describing efforts to exacerbate Kurdish-Arab tensions,
for the most part this aspect of events in Kurdistan (as well
as the conflict between the Kurds and government troops) was
down-played. Thus, the focus of discussion centered on the
theme that increasing numbers of Arabs and Kurds recognized
that "the forces kindling the armed conflict in the north of
Iraq" were "trying to eliminate all the gains of the Iraqi
revolution, (and) undermine the integrity and sovereignty
50of that country".
One finds that the Soviet response to the Kurdish 
problem was interwined with the USSR's attitude towardsthe 
three major parties in Iraq - the Ba'th Party, the ICP, and 
the KDP - as well as the state of Soviet-Iraq relations. The 
Soviets had traditionally utilized the Kurdish desire for 
autonomy as a lever to apply pressure on the Iraqi government. 
Following the Ba'thist take-over in July 1968, however, the 
USSR began to improve ties with Iraq. The March 1970 agree­
ment between Baghdad and the Kurds consequently was inter­
preted by Soviet media as a positive step in the right 
direction. It was asserted time and again that the USSR 
has always stood for "the peaceful democratic resolution"
51of "this highly important question for the destiny of Iraq".
An article in Pravda, in early April 1970, had cited a 
member of the Politburo of the Kurdish Democratic Party as 
stating:
9y
"The friendly Soviet Union gave support to 
a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question; 
...the USSR helped to clear the atmosphere with 
the aim of encouraging dialogue and furthered 
the attainment of results necessary to ensure 
Arab and Kurd interests*1. 52
Consequently , terms such as "sincerely welcomies", 
"greatly pleased", and "greatly appreciated" were used liber­
ally to describe the Soviet response to the conclusion of 
53the agreement. Between mid-1970 and the end of the 1973, 
Moscow was cautiously optimistic concerning the establishment 
of an autonomous Kurdistan. The Soviet media, needless to add, 
was full of warnings to both the Kurds and the Arabs to 
remain true to their objective of a united Iraq embracing 
both nationalities in the face of efforts to sabotage the 
negotiations. Moreover, especially in late 1972 and into 1973, 
the Soviet media implied on various occasions that all was 
not moving smoothly towards an agreement. By September 1972, 
the USSR media was pointedly citing its own interpretation 
of its nationality policy as an example for the Iraqis:
"The measures adopted in Iraq to implement the 
March 11, 1970 declaration concerning the demo­
cratic and peaceful solution of the Kurdish issue 
finds complete understanding and satisfaction in 
Soviet Union. It is known that (in) the Soviet 
Union...the questions of nationalities were 
successfully solved...This was recognized on 
the basis of the recognition and the practical 
application of equality among all nationalities 
...Hence, (the Soviet people) sincerely welcome 
the steps being taken in Iraq in this direction".
At the same time, officially the USSR adopted a 
friendly attitude towards the KDP. In August of 1971, for 
example, the CPSU Central Committee sent the KDP a telegram
10U
of congratulations on the laser's 25th anniversary. This
message referred to the KDP's "activities in defence of
legitimate national interests of the Iraqi people" and that
it "deserved recognition of the progressive patriotic 
55forces". A year later representatives of both the KDP
and the CPSU reportedly agreed concerning "the need to form
56a national front for the patriotic forces in Iraq". Both 
sides also expressed "satisfaction that relations of 
friendship and cooperation had been established between 
the CPSU and the KDP and other progressive parties" in
T 57Iraq.
Following the KDP's refusal to join the National
Front in July 1973, the situation however deteriorated to
such a point that in November 1973, fighting erupted between
the Communists and the Kurdish partisans. At the end of
November, Boris Ponomarev led a delegation to Iraq apparently
in an effort to mediate between the antagonists. Despite a
series of alleged meetings with the Iraqi Communists, tfie
KDP and the Ba'thists, however, this effort at mediation 
58failed. In January 1974, the Soviet media acknowledged
the gravity of the situation in northern Iraq. Discussing
the situation in Kurdistan, a Radio Moscow broadcast first
recalled that in November 1973 a KDP delegation had met
with Ponomarev in Moscow and at that time both the CPSU and
the KDP expressed an awareness of the necessity to implement
59the March 1970 agreement. The broadcast went on to state;
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Disputes and quarrels between the various 
revolutionary...must not be allowed to hinder 
the strengthening of the unity of the country's 
patriotic forces, especially at the time when 
the Iraqi people are engaged alongwith the other 
people, in a stubborn struggle to remove the 
consequences of Israeli aggression. The Kurds 
are considered part of the Iraqi people. As 
such they are very concerned about putting an 
end to the Israeli aggression and recovering 
the usurped rights of all the fraternal peoples. 
Leaders of the democratic Kurdish movement have 
frequently pointed out this fact...(Soviet 
people) can only express regret at quarrels 
between these two groups (Arabs & Kurds), major 
revolutionary forces in the nascent Iraqi 
republic. Soviet citizens are fully aware of 
the close cooperation which has been going 
on for several years between the ICP and the 
KDP and of the joint struggle of these two 
parties against imperialism and reactionaries. 
For this reason they are confident that these 
two parties can put an end to the quarrel and 
reach understanding for the sake of progressive 
development..."60
Throughout the Winter and Spring of 1974 and onwards, 
the Soviet media seemed to continue to leave the impression 
that the Kurdish problem could be solved peacefully. At 
about the same time, the Soviet media also began to develop 
the theme that right wing elements were becoming increasingly 
powerful within the Kurdish movement. By the end of April 1974, 
Moscow publicly abandoned hope of a peaceful solution. It 
was now asserted that the right wing elements of the KDP 
had become dominant in the KDP and these elements were 
betraying the "Kurdish cause" to the West and the Zionists.
It should be pointed out however, that the media refrained 
from speaking of Iranian support to the Kurds. It was very 
rare that the Iranian media, along with the Turkish media, 
was criticized for publicizing inflammatory reports.
Nevertheless, the Soviet media with implicit approval
61continued to report Baghdad's response to the situation.
It was also highlighted that the left wing of the Kurdish
movement was working with the Iraqi government to solve
6 2the Kurdish problem and form the National Front.
Meanwhile, as the USSR abandoned the KDP, fighting 
continued to rage in northern Iraq. Despite efforts by Baghdad 
to cut Kurdish supply lines to Iran in the Autumn of 1974, 
these lines remained open and Iran continued to provide 
large amounts of supplies to the Kurdish movement. Failing 
to defeat the Kurds on the battlefield, Baghdad altered its 
approach and in March 1975, Iran and Iraq reached an agreement 
whereby Iran would terminate its support to the Kurdish up­
rising and Iraq would agree to Iran's demands concerning the 
Iran-Iraq border issues. Now, with Tehran and Moscow both 
having abandoned the Kurds, their uprising collapsed. Many 
Kurds escaped to Iran before Tehran closed the frontier, 
while some Kurds availed themselves of Baghdad’s amnesty 
terms. The Soviet media was virtually without comment con­
cerning the implications of the.Iran-Iraq settlement on 
events in Kurdistan. On only one occasion did Moscow make 
the association. In doing so, one finds an extra caution
in citing the Lebanese newspaper Al-Mohrrer as the source
6 3of its information.
It would be fair to conclude that the Kurdish 
problem was neither created nor solved by the Soviet influence. 
The USSR, during the period under study, was primarily respond­
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ing to the other's initiatives. It, however, did show active 
interest in resolving it by promoting its own image of the 
nationalities problem. One gets the impression studying the 
Soviet response that it preferred to avoid active involvement 
in the crisis itself. Nevertheless, recognizing that non­
involvement was virtually impossible due to cross pressures, 
Moscow, quite understandably attempted to make the best 
use of the situation by making the difficult choices necessary 
in such a way as to maximize its future options. The desire 
to court all the three major parties involved (the Ba'th 
Party, the ICP, and the KDP) was again persistently reflected 
by the Soviet media, apparently with an eye on same objectives 
as were present in the establishment of a united front. Since 
the Soviet response was interwined with the USSR's attitude 
towards the three major parties and as well as the state of 
Iraq-Soviet relations, the Soviets perhaps never came to 
grips with the complexities of the situation on the ground 
and the media repeatedly gave hasty judgements on the situation. 
The Western 'conspiracies', of course, remained convenient 
targets and were time and again accused for all policy set-backs.
The USSR virtually ignored the connection between 
Iran-Iraq relations and the Kurdish question. The Soviets appa­
rently thought it better to simply ignore the Iranian role in 
Kurdistan since there was little they could do to affect the 
Iranian policy towards the Kurdish situation. The border 
conflict between Iran and Iraq was sufficiently embarrasing
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to the USSR without adding further to the embarrassment by 
commenting on the Iranian role in the Kurdish uprising. In 
the next chapter on Iran-Iraq relations, we shall see that 
despite Soviet urging that Baghdad and Tehran compose their 
differences, Moscow never really had any influence over their 
relationship either.
CHAPTER-5
IRAN-IRAQ RELATIONS
Soviet analysts consistently interpreted Western 
activities as designed to exacerbate tensions between Iraq 
and Iran. They portrayed these efforts as being an integral 
part of the West's 'divide and rule' strategy. The origins 
of the Iran-Iraq dispute were traced back to 'the ominous 
era of colonial domination in the Middle East'. During that 
period the British allegedly attempted to stimulate an atmos­
phere characterized by tension. It was for this reason that 
the border between these two countries was determined in 
"such a way as to ignore interests" of both countries. Moscow 
also claimed that in certain areas the border was not even 
delineated clearly. The tension along the Iran-Iraq border 
was used by Britain to "maintain its positions, delay the 
development of the national liberation trend, and, the 
struggle against the British monopolies which loot the 
resources of these two countries". It was, moreover, pointed 
out that the British have traditionally attempted to create 
an adversary relationship between Iraq and Iran.1
Following the decline of British power in the Middle 
East, the United States continued with the policies of exacer­
bating tensions between the two neighbours, Soviet commentators 
maintained. As a result, "misunderstandings and conflicts" 
continued to occur. Soviet commentators held that the Iraq-Iran
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border dispute, which periodically manifested itself 
in armed clashes, only served the interests of the West -
3"the common enemy of the two states".
It was claimed that tension between Iraq and Iran 
served Western interests in a series of ways. This theme 
was developed in greater depth in various ways and was 
echoed time and again. First, tension was allegedly used by
4the West "as a diversion to mask" the British and American 
subversive plots in the Persian Gulf area. Second, tensions, 
and ultimately military hostilities between Iraq and Iran, 
were supposedly used to argue that Western troops must be 
retained in the area to prevent regional instability. 
Moreover, Western interventions into the internal affairs 
of the Persian Gulf States were justified in a similar 
manner. . Third, the West had used, it was emphasised, 
Iraq-Iran tensions to rationalise and accelerate the regional 
0arms race. Fourth, the existence of tensions helped to
7justify CENTO's (then) intensified activities. Fifth, the 
West was accused of exacerbating Iraq-Iran tensions in order 
to divert Iraq's attention from the progressive socio-economic 
reform programmes undertaken domestically and weaken her
gposition within the Arab world and internationally.
Lastly, the West was accused of increasing tension between 
Iraq and Iran in order to disrupt cooperation among the oil 
producers and ultimately destroy the Organization of
9Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
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In an effort to promote this strategy the West was
said to have perpetuated the idea that Iraq had aggressive
designs on Iran. Moreover, it was alleged that the Western
media put forth the interpretation that the differences
between Iraq and Iran were too serious to be reconcilable
and therefore, military hostilities were inevitable.10 This
interpretation was repeatedly questioned by Soviet observers
by stating that there were "no irreconcilable differences"
between the two states. 1 It was frequently stated that
"Iraq has no territorial or other claims on Iran" just as
12"Iran has no claims on Iraq". It was argued that there
were no barriers to the establishment of, and maintenance of,
normal and mutually advantageous relations between the two
13neighbours, rather the interests of these two states coin- 
cided in many areas.
The two neighbours were said to have in common their
15territorial and cultural heritage. In addition, both were
attempting to promote socio-economic modernization programmes.
Moreover, both were attempting to gain full control over their
17natural resources, the foremost being oil. On many occasions,
<*>
Iraq and Iran were referred to,having adopted coordinated
18policies within the framework of OPEC. Similarly, through
various international organizations, the two states had
cooperated to "eliminate unequal trade and economic relations"
and replace them with cooperation based on equality and 
19sovereignty. Both states used the Persian Gulf as a
communications and trade link abroad. They both had an
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interest in the maintenance of tranquility in the area.
Finally, both states were said to be united in their common
desire to halt "imperialist aggression" abroad and secure
21"international peace and security". Moscow often pointed 
to "the desire on part of both" states to "insure a lasting 
and just peace in the Near East by liquidating the vestiges 
of Israeli aggression" as "a common bond" between Iraq and
T 22Iran.
In short, Soviet writers maintained that "the factors
conducive to the two countries' close relations are neither
lacking nor inadequate, and this convincingly shows that
successful improvement of relations between Iran and Iraq
23in the interest of their peoples is possible". The improve­
ment of relations between them "would create conditions 
conducive to the expansion of economic cooperation, cooperation 
in defence of their interests against the Western oil companies,
and conversion of the Gulf area into a region characterized
24by peace, stability and security". -Furthermore, favourable 
conditions "would be established for acceleration of the
25
socio-economic reforms already underway in the two countries".
Finally, in a larger sense, a dangerous situation in the area
already characterised by its explosive nature, one which could
potentially "result in a large-scale war between the two
countries perhaps endangering the general peace" would be
26defused. Based on all these considerations, Soviet analysis 
asserted that it was in both the Iraqi and Irani interests,
20
as well as in the interests of the "anti-imperialist
struggle" generally, that the two powers should "settle
the border dispute as well as other differences, through
peaceful means". It was further stressed that negotiations
constitute "the only fruitful path leading to the settlement
of the most complicated problems and disputes, on the basis
of mutual respect and interests". "Detente", was said to
have helped to create conditions necessary for the normali-
27zation of relations between Iran and Iraq.
The Soviet media devoted a fair amount of attention
to the cyclical pattern of Iran-Iraq relations. Prior to 1973,
the media reported various manifestations of tension between
the Iranians and Iraqis. In April 1969, for example, Soviet
analysts discussed the border clashes along the River
28Shatt-al-Arab. Later in January 1970, relations reportedly
deteriorated to the extent that on December 1, 1971, Iraq
broke off diplomatic relations with Iran and Great Britain
after Iranian troops landed on Abu Musa, Greater Tumb and
29Lesser Tumb Islands. In May 1973, Moscow noted a movement, 
accelerated by the 1973 Arab-Israel war, towards an improve­
ment in relations between the two neighbours. On October 7, 
1973, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council decided to 
resume diplomatic relations with Iran. The Iranians, for 
their part, were said to have responded favourably to the
Iraqi overture to undertake negotiations aimed at the
30solution of outstanding issues. It was stated, in rather 
definite terms, that "there is not the slightest doubt
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that possibilities exist for the settlement of the dispute.
It is possible if both countries show good-will and
..31 tolerance".
Accompanying the restoration of diplomatic relations 
was a reduction of tension along the Irano-Iraqi border.
In February 1974, however, tension dramatically escalated 
as new fighting was reported along the border. The Iraqi 
government complained to the United Nations Security Council 
and the latter initiated an investigation. It was subse­
quently reported on 15 February 1974 that the Security 
Council completed its consideration of the crisis by appeal­
ing to both Iran and Iraq to refrain from any steps that 
could aggrevate the situation. In addition, the Security
Council suggested that the UN Secretary General appoint
32a representative to inquire further into the clash. On
March 1974, Moscow reported that two days earlier Iranian
troops had attacked Iraqi frontier units thereby causing
33a further deterioration in relations. There were, however, 
no accompanying reports giving the Iranian side of the 
incident in the broadcast. However, this is not to suggest 
that the Soviets had decided to take the Iraqi side - as
many of the subsequent reports reflected a neutralist
4. ^ 34 stand.
In May 1974, the UN Secretary General was quoted 
as reporting that both Iran and Iraq had expressed willing­
ness to observe the ceasefire, to withdraw their forces
Ill
from the frontier, and to resume negotiations in order to
promote a peaceful solution to the dispute. Negotiations
were held in the Summer of 1974. In September, the Soviet
media noted that in their first stage of discussions, held
in Istanbul, the two antagonists had reached agreement con-
35cerning the agenda for subsequent talks. Despite scattered 
incidents, meetings continued between representatives^of 
Iran and Iraq and finally on 6 March 1975 Soviet observers 
announced that the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussain (Vice-
Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Council) had reached a
37"final and long term settlement" of the dispute. Describing 
the terms of the agreement, the same report further stated 
that both sides had agreed to negotiate a final delineation 
of the borders and establish an effective system of frontier 
control. The decision was to be implemented by the joint 
Irani-Iraqi Commission following procedures to be defined 
at a Foreign Ministers meeting scheduled to be held in 
Tehran.
Soviet observers hailed the defusing of a dangerous 
situation. They observed that the agreement constituted a
38major setback for the Western policy of 'divide and rule'.
It was also highlighted that "it was no coincidence" that 
a fellow oil-producer, Algeria, should have proposed the 
talks and that President Boumedienne should have played 
a personal role in the conduct of the negotiations.^
I* '«S afa  -V •* ■•r—i-t:i OTfr'iV"'i vir—‘t***“"m rinrTTii n-i .:ihjwwji’tjur..'*»fif** ~ .
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Between March 15-17, a meeting was held between the 
Iranian and Iraqi Foreign Ministers which the Algerian Foreign 
Minister also attended with observer status. At the meeting 
the Foreign Ministers established three joint commissions, 
each to deal with a specific aspect and the border demarcation 
project. In addition, protocols providing for regular contacts 
between the two neighbouring states were also signed. Finally, 
it was agreed that additional meetings would be held in order 
to conclude a final agreement concering the outstanding 
disputes. It was reported Wt&r that "relations
between Iraq and Iran have been "completely normal since 
March 1975", and that the agreement between these two 
countries
"...lays down foundations for easing the dangerous 
tension which had plagued the relations between two 
neighbouring Middle Eastern states for a long time. 
The point was reached even when armed clashes took 
place and claimed unnecessary victims on both^sides. 
Hard feelings between Iraq and Iran were kinds»red... 
by foreign imperialist powers which wanted to achieve 
their own selfish objectives,which are primarily 
linked with their plans of consolidating their 
foothold in the Gulf area, The policy of divide 
and rule seeks to achieve these objectives in 
particular..." 41
These developments were welcomed by "public opinion" 
throughout the Arab world. In an extremely rare announce­
ment linking the Iran-Iraq dispute with the Kurdish problem, 
Soviet writers stated that the Lebanese Al-Moharrar commented 
that the normalization of relations between the two countries 
had made "for the ending of the bloody clashes in Iraqi 
Kurdistan". It was also reported that on 13 March an agreement
I
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was concluded with the Kurdish forces through the Iranian 
mediation J*'-
Throughout the entirety of the Irano-Iraq border 
dispute in the period of our study, the USSR assumed the 
position of a concerned, but objective, observer. It wiis 
often stated that
"the USSR enjoys sincere, friendly and comprehen­
sive relations with both Iran and Iraq. Conse­
quently, the Soviet people have a great interest 
in seeing the normalization of relations between 
their friends in the Middle East and the estab­
lishment of cooperation and good neighbourly 
relations between them".4-3
Soviet analysts claimed that the USSR had always 
held that the border disputes and other differences between 
countries should be solved by peaceful means and that 
"the Soviet public firmly believes that there are no 
differences between Iraq and Iran that cannot be peacefully 
resolved".^ It was argued that prolongation of the dispute 
ran counter to the interests of both sides and only served 
the interests of the West. Along these lines, referring to 
an article which appeared in Kayhan International, Radio 
Moscow in a broadcast stated that while Iraq and India 
"may feel apprehensive" concerning the Iranian build-up 
of "'defensive1 weapons (of Iran)... there is no reason 
to believe that Moscow also shares this view". The comment­
ator then went on to encourage the solution of their disputes 
by peaceful means. Consequently, “the USSR considers these 
border clashes between the two countries improper and 
unjustified" ^
Soviet media frequently used such phrases as 
'regrettable' and 'sadness of the Soviet people' in describ­
ing the reaction to any renewal of fighting. Conversely, 
words such as 'praise-worthy' and 'admirable' were used to 
characterise any moves by the two states to resolve their 
dispute by peaceful means. The 'Soviet people* were reported 
to have received such developments with 'pleasure and happi­
ness* . It was stated by Radio Moscow that
•’establishing cooperation... on an anti­
imperialist basis will promote the strength­
ening of the foundations of peace and security 
in this region and will help to banish certain 
phenomenon for the life of the area which are 
extremely regrettable,... (reapproachment)... 
is undoubtedly a cause of pleasure". 4-6
On November 18, 1974, well after negotiations were 
underway between Iraq and Iran, Nikolay Podgorny equated 
the Asian Collective Security proposal with the Iran-Iraq 
border dispute at a dinner given in honour of the Shah 
of Iran. Podgorny first noted that conflicts anywhere 
in Asia including "the Persian Gulf area" jeopardised the
«
general peace. He then stated that the USSR favoured a 
solution to the differences by "these (Iraq and Iran)
countries themselves at a conference table on the basis
LIof peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness". 
Immediately following this, Podgorny launched into a 
discussion of the Asian Collective Security Scheme. This 
speech set the tone for subsequent analysis of the Iran-Iraq 
dispute which appeared in the Soviet media over the next 
few months. ^
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Finally, eliminating any possible doubt that the 
Soviet Union intended to link the Iran-Iraq settlement with 
the Asian Collective Security proposal, on March 19, 1975 
Radio Moscow reminded its listeners of the proposed security 
system. The reminder was preceded by a full discussion on 
the implications of the (then) recent agreement concluded 
by the two states. The Radio Moscow commentator then stated 
that the factors necessitating the establishment of the
Collective Security System in Asia "applies to countries
4-9like Iran and Iraq”. f The agreement between Iraq and Iran 
in other words, was being interpreted within the framework 
of the proposed Collective Security System which otherwise 
was hardly taken seriously by them.
The use of the Collective Security proposal as 
a frame of reference for analysis of the Iran-Iraq agreement 
was perhaps reflective of the Soviet policy of seeking 
dividends at low risks, low costs and minimal involvement.
The USSR was apparently attempting to do at least two more 
things. First, to show how two states, which were already 
linked to the proposed Collective Security System, were 
now working within the spirit of the proposed system to 
ameliorate tensions. In other words, the USSR seemed to be 
attempting to show that the principles underlying the proposed 
system could reduce regional tensions thus illustrating the 
desirability of establishing the proposed system. In this 
regard, Moscow may have also felt that that sort of 
application of the principles governing the proposed system
would accelerate the establishment of the system itself. 
Secondly, the introduction of the Collective Security 
proposal into a discussion of Iran-Iraq tensions may have 
been a way whereby Moscow was attempting to remain aloof 
from what was clearly a disconcerting dispute between'two 
of its neighbours. Significantly, by linking the proposed 
system with the dispute during a period of reduced tensions, 
presumably, it would then have been easier for Moscow to 
hide behind the proposal should tension again escalate in 
future; the USSR could then use the opportunity to illustrate 
the need to establish the proposed system. In any case, one 
finds that Moscow's emphasis on the proposed system was 
casual and low-keyed. At best, it aimed at some political 
dividends, and that too without much of policy initiative 
and involvement.
The factors motivating the Soviet response to the 
tensions between Iraq and Iran were many. The USSR had a 
great deal to lose by taking sides. Moscow apparently recog­
nised that to support either side would risk damaging 
its own relations with the other. Moreover, there was a danger 
that an obvious support for Iraq would alienate Gulf States 
such as Kuwait, which had border dispute with Iraq in the 
period, or Syria. Conversely, such an obvious support for 
Iran would alienate majority of the Arabs. There was also 
a strong liklihood that the side deprived of Soviet support 
would turn increasingly to the West or, at least to some 
extent, to the Chinese. The Soviets, of course, would have
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been the least appreciative of the idea that either Iran 
or Iraq - first an important southern neighbour and the 
second an important gain in the Arab world - should 
move any closer to the West.
If the Soviet Union was seen as attempting to 
play an important role, political or military, many Western 
and Third world governments would have professed to see it 
as an attempt to dominate the Gulf. Thus, the risk of prompt­
ing the West or the regional states into over-reaction was 
something that Soviets had to be careful about.
Then, of course, there was the general problem of 
taking sides in a dispute over frontiers, this being a very 
sensitive issue in the Third World. The Soviets had to be 
very circumspect in their comment on the 1975 agreement as on 
the one hand Iraq subsequently used force to try to change 
frontiers, on the other the frontiers it tried to change 
was one essentially imposed of it in X975 as the price for 
Iran abandoning its support for the Kurdish insurrection 
i.e., for giving up an effort to subver&r the territorial 
integrity of Iraq. It appears that the Soviets have been 
showing sensitivity to this general attitude of the Third 
World countries. It should be recalled that in 1976-77, 
Somalia's effort to change frontiers was a factor in the 
Soviet switch of support to Ethiopia. Therefore, the USSR 
would really be gaining little by supporting one side or 
the other. The costs of taking sides, thus, clearly out-
'.'.srr
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weighed any gains which might have been secured.
In short, the USSR obviously felt the best share 
to assure towards the dispute was that of a concerned but 
objective observer who constantly counselled the anatagonists 
to resolve disputes through peaceful means. This policy was 
similar to the Soviet reaction to other regional disputes
such as between the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen
50 51and the United Arab Emirates or between Iraq and Kuwait/1
or in the sub-continent between India and Pakistan over
Kashmir.^
CHAPTER-^
CONCLUSIONS
The Persian Gulf area has for long been an area 
of keen interest for Moscow. As for M o s c o w 1s interests and 
policies, various interpretations have been offered by scholars 
Nevertheless, it remains one of the most controversial and 
intriguing areas of understanding; as William Zimmerman 
has stated in a recent survey of theoretical literature on 
Soviet policy "the 'truth1 as we know-about Soviet behaviour... 
is more definitely truth with a small ' t 1.
In this paper we have recapitulated Soviet policy 
towards the problems faced by Ba'thist Iraq during 1968-1975, 
as projected by Soviet media. The purpose of undertaking such 
a study was to bring into perspective the Soviet perception 
ofthe three interrelated problems faced by Iraq, namely, 
formation of united front, the Kurdish question, and 
Iran-Iraq relations, and the manner in which these affected 
the development of Soviet policy. The justification for 
undertaking this was that during the period under study Iraq 
was the only country in the area where these basic tenets 
of the Soviet ideological framework were put to the test 
simultaneously. Since geography and history are an integral 
part of the operational and psychological environment of any 
nation, shaping and conditioning its external orientation, 
we have given a survey of major recurrents of history of
* William Zimmerman, "What Do Scholars Know About Soviet 
Foreign P o l i c y " , international Journal (Vol. XXXVII, N o . 2, 
Spring 1982), p.198.
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Tsarist Russia’s interests and policies in the area. However, 
both geopolitical and historical continuity explanations 
remain theoretically inadequate and historically inaccurate. 
Therefore, we have discussed also the Soviet ideological 
framework, within which the Soviets explain and justify 
their policies.
There was a prolonged ‘Cold War' from the beginning 
ofthe nineteenth century between the Tsarist and British empires 
over what was called ‘the Central Asian Question1 stretching 
from India, Afghanistan, and Iran on the one hand, to the 
Turkish Straits and Constantinople on the other. Iraq, lying 
between these two poles, had very little importance of its 
own. The definition and scope of Tsarist interests varied 
from statesman to statesman and from time to time not only 
because individual perceptions vary, but also because of 
the general political situation in Europe and the nature of 
relationships with the British and Ottoman empires, and 
at times with France and later with Imperial Germany and 
Japan. All these influenced, in varying degrees, the 
formulation and execution of Russian policy.
Russian expansion in the Caucasus was viewed as 
preliminary to further expansion in the direction of the 
Euphrates Valley, for eventual control of Baghdad and Basra.
The British fearedthat the Russian expansion into thei
Euphrates Valley would mean a frontal attack on the Ottoman 
Empire. Against such fears, the Russian primary interest-
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had remained avoidance of any direct confrontation with 
Britain and secondly, to get the largest possible share of 
the Ottoman Empire,^and when it disintegrated. Pressure 
was periodically applied on British India through Afghanistan 
and Iran, primarily to maximise the Tsarist gains.
The areas constituting today’s Iraq had little 
importance of their own for Russian interests and objectives 
in the Persian Gulf area. These objectives, at best, viewed 
the area asa base for other operations and were largely deter­
mined by the nature of international policies at the time.
For example the Persian Gulf area was merely a means through 
which diversionary pressure could be applied against Great 
Britain^ important only insofar as the international situation«
at the time allowed it to be a means through which higher 
ends might be attained.
The situation has changed fundamentally as neither 
the Persian Gulf is a British lake nor India is in the 
British Empire. Likewise, main antagonist is no longer 
Great Britain, but the United States against whom the pressure 
cannot be exerted in quite the same way as was the case during 
the Tsarist times. Therefore, chapter one has argued, inter­
pretations basedbn hsitory are totally invalid and irrelevant 
and are, by and large, a carry-over of a situation which no 
longer exists. Coupled with this is the change in the nature 
of the Soviet state as was manifested under the Bolshevik 
regime of Lenin and Stalin.
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The Bolsheviks have argued that Tsarist policy was 
guided by imperial and class interests and that there is no 
continuity whatsoever since the October Revolution. The USSR 
claims that its policy is guided by Marxist-Leninist principles, 
under which Capitalism is perceived as a passing epoch in the 
inevitable historical process which would culminate in the 
ultimate victory of the proletariat. The concept of national 
liberation is the single most powerful ideological tenet in 
Soviet relations with the developing countries. In line with 
the general doctrinal reappraisals regarding the newly inde­
pendent countries, the 1960s were marked by a new phase in 
Soviet policy towards the Gulf area.
The victorious proletariat is held duty bound to 
consolidate its gains and continue strengthening itself inter­
nationally. Hence, it is claimed that the victorious prole­
tariat is the natural ally supporting and guiding all pro­
gressive forces the world over. Presently, however, the 
USSR is isolated and surrounded by hostile (nuclear) 
imperialist powers which are eager to destroy the rising 
revolutionary wave emanating from the Soviet State. The 
inevitability of war, therefore, was revised in favour of 
peaceful coexistence and participation in the international 
(capitalist) system as competition between capitalism and 
socialism was now to be carried out peacefully. In view of 
this, the responsibility of the Soviet State was to defend 
the revolutionary gains already made in order to promote 
thghistorical process internally as well as internationally.
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Since history is perceived to be on the Soviet side and 
the ultimate victory as inevitable, it was not held necessary 
for the Soviet State to jeopardise its own existence in order 
to advance the historical process on an international level.
No fixed time table is given for the ultimate triumph.
Theoretically, however, the Soviet policy challenges 
the framework of the international system. It is important 
to note two qualifying factors which tend to blunt the 
impactj'of a policy which is theoretically destabilizing.
First, the USSR views change in the framework of the inter­
national system as inevitable. Hence, the Soviet State need 
not desperately work for change, especially since to do so 
may jeopardise its own security. Consequently, the destabiliz­
ing influence ofthe USSR in the Persian Gulf area has not 
been so great as it might have been. Second, throughout the 
entire period under study, the USSR by and large lacked 
the power to do anything more than seek change within the 
framework of the system/ While the Soviet leaders maintained 
that their policy was ultimately designed to challenge the 
international system, in fact their policy framework merely 
sought change within the system by cultivating relations 
with all regional actors.
The analysis of contemporary Soviet objectives in 
the Persian Gulf area must then be framed within the definition 
of Soviet objectives in the developing countries. Indeed,
Soviet objectives in the area south of the Soviet State
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have remainedmuch the same since 1917. Soviet leaders have 
continuously sought to neutralize all threats to Soviet 
security emanating from the rival powers1 presence.
While pursuing these objectives the USSR has • 
simultaneously encouraged the establishment of progressive, 
friendly regimes (like Iraq) on the one hand, and cultivated 
friendlier relations with all types of 'conservative' and 
'pro-western' regimes (like Iran) on the other. This means 
that the USSR has attempted to undermine, or at least contain, 
the development of economic and political relations between 
such countries and the western powers. Simultaneously, the 
USSR has itself attempted to develop close economic,political 
and, if possible, military ties with these newly independent 
countries. In pursuing this latter objective, however, it 
should be noted that the principal motive in the short term 
was not the establishment of revolutionary regimes but rather 
the elimination of what Moscow perceived as threatening 
western presences.
It must be stressed however, that despite progress 
in all-round ties with Iraq, and close economic bonds with 
Iran, the Soviet ability to affect the policies of those 
states remained extremly limited. In some cases the USSR 
was able to affect the attitudes of Iraqi leaders or of 
the ICP and/or the KDP. More often, however, its media 
coverage reflected its inability to do so.
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This lack of control over the policies of the 
regional state has .often resulted in the USSR being dragged 
into internal conflicts and regional crisis over which the 
Kremlin had little or no control. Indeed, it often presented 
problems foijthe Soviet leadership, particularly in those 
cases were the conflict involved rival states and or move­
ments both of which the USSR was attempting to court. Indeed 
upon examination of the USSR's response to the various con­
flicts and crisis which surfaced in the Gulf area between 
1968-1977, one gets the clear impression that the Kremlin 
would have preferred to have remained aloof from virtually 
all of them. In the final analysis, Soviet inability to 
control either the actions of the regional actors or the 
coursqfof the crisis which emerged in the area, combined 
with the Kremlin's apparent reluctance to become involved, 
accounted for its cautious stance in responding to these 
situations.
While the Soviets succeeded in establishing close 
relations with Iraq, they lacked the power to consistently 
shape the policies of either the Ba'th Party or of the ICP. 
The lack of power in this case proved disadvantageous con­
sidering the fact that Iraqi policies often conflicted 
with the policies of other states (eg Iran) , or actors 
(eg KDP) with which USSR hoped to maintain correct relations, 
This meant embarrassing choices for the USSR-choices which 
often resulted in alienating the side deprived of Soviet 
support.
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Indeed, Moscow*s efforts to develop close relations 
with antagonistic actors within a State or between two 
States without simultaneously having any effective way of 
influencing the antagonists was perhaps the greatest contra­
diction in Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf area during the 
period under our study.
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